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Mad Money: Rethinking Private
Placements
Abraham J.B. Cable
Abstract
Currently, regulations try to limit unregistered sales of stock
(private placements) to the “smart money,” either by informing
investors through disclosure or excluding unsophisticated
investors from the market. In theory, these smart-money
approaches promote the dual goals of capital formation and
investor protection. But in practice, regulators have struggled to
craft effective disclosure or screening mechanisms. In light of these
failures, this Article advocates for a new approach—investment
caps that allow every investor a limited amount of “mad money” to
invest in risky private placements. This mad-money approach can
protect investors by encouraging basic diversification and
liquidity, while advancing capital formation at least as well as
alternatives.
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I. Introduction
When President Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (JOBS Act) into law, he deemed it a potential “game
changer.”1 Specifically, he commended the law for nurturing the
next Facebook or Apple by easing restrictions on unregistered
sales of stock, referred to as private placements.2 But bold
predictions and plucky name aside, the law is mostly a
continuation of stale approaches to regulating private
placements. True, startup companies can now sell stock through
third-party “crowdfunding” sites modeled after Kickstarter, but
only after providing prescribed and costly information to
investors.3 True, a startup company can now solicit investors
1. Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobsact-bill-signing (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
2. See id.
And who knows, maybe one of them or one of the folks in the
audience here today will be the next Bill Gates or Steve Jobs or Mark
Zuckerberg. And one of them may be the next entrepreneur to turn a
big idea into an entire new industry. That’s the promise of America.
That’s what this country is all about.
3. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) § 302, Pub. L.
No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(creating a new crowdfunding exemption). Prior to the JOBS Act, crowdfunding
sites were limited to charitable purposes or advanced product sales, out of
concern that sale of stock would violate securities laws. See Benjamin P. Siegel,
Title III of the JOBS Act: Using Unsophisticated Wealth to Crowdfund Small
Business Capital or Fraudsters’ Bank Accounts?, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777, 781–
88 (2013) (describing legal impediments to crowdfunding prior to the JOBS Act);
see generally C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) (providing an overview of
crowdfunding practices and proposals prior to the JOBS Act). For critiques of
the JOBS Act crowdfunding exemption, see Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding
or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially
Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1735, 1741–44 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of disclosure
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through its own website, but only if it limits sales to wealthy
investors deemed capable of making sound financial decisions.4
Like prior law, the JOBS Act primarily tries to protect investors
by creating (through disclosure) and identifying (through investor
qualification standards) the “smart money.”5
Congress’s decision to double down on these smart-money
approaches is puzzling. Regulators have struggled to identify
information that investors actually value, as evidenced by disuse
of exemptions conditioned on specified disclosure.6 Moreover, it is
at best questionable whether wealth standards are a reasonable
measure of investment capabilities—for example, a successful
dentist may know little about hedge funds.7 For the JOBS Act,
the unfortunate implications are that: (1) issuers and investors
will steer clear of the crowdfunding exemption because of its rigid
disclosure requirements, and (2) the JOBS Act’s liberalized rules

requirements in crowdfunding exemptions); Joan MacLeod Heminway, How
Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty
Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments That Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J.
865, 867–68 (2014) (criticizing Congress’s role in setting parameters of the
crowdfunding exemption); Siegel, supra, at 781, 799–807 (critiquing the JOBS
Act crowdfunding provisions and proposing “a workable solution that properly
balances the goals of the federal securities laws—the facilitation of capital
formation through transparent securities offerings and the deterrence of
investor fraud”); James J. Williamson, The JOBS Act and Middle-Income
Investors: Why It Doesn’t Go Far Enough, 122 YALE L.J. 2069 (2013) (arguing
that the crowdfunding exemption should be more accessible to investors who are
not affluent).
4. Prior to the JOBS Act, sales through an issuer’s website or other public
forums violated the “ban on general solicitation.” See Abraham J.B. Cable,
Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel
Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 134 (2011) (providing an overview of the “ban
on general solicitation” before the implementation of the JOBS Act); William K.
Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and
Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2004). The JOBS Act
eliminated the ban, provided all investors meet wealth standards set forth in
the accredited investor definition. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).
5. Investopedia defines smart money as “[c]ash invested or wagered by
those considered to be experienced, well-informed, ‘in-the-know’ or all three.”
Smart Money, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smartmoney.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
6. See infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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for sales to accredited investors leave wealthy but
unsophisticated investors unprotected.8
But despite the JOBS Act’s broader failures,9 this Article
finds something redeeming in one of the law’s more obscure
provisions. Buried deep in the new crowdfunding exemption is a
building block for future exemptions—an “investment cap”
limiting the amount any single purchaser can invest.10 For
example, an investor with a net worth of $250,000 can invest no
more than $25,000 in crowdfunding offerings annually.11 In
contrast to smart-money approaches, an investment cap assumes
that many individual investments will fail and simply tries to
mitigate the effects of such losses by preventing a small number
of private placements from dominating any single investor’s
portfolio. In other words, each investor is allowed a limited
amount of “mad money”12 for presumably risky private placement
8. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Rebalancing Private Placement
Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2013)
Based on more than a decade of following, researching, and writing
about private placement regulation, I fear that the latest round of
capital formation enhancements has tilted the balance too far in favor
of capital formation and away from investor protection, especially
given the size of the private placement market today.
9. For a general overview of the JOBS Act and its shortcomings, see
Michael D. Guttentag, Protection From What? Investor Protection and the JOBS
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 234 (2013) (“[T]he JOBS Act was notable both
for the speed with which it was enacted and the limited consideration of its
potential impact.”).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012) (imposing limits on the amount a
particular issuer can sell to a particular investor in a crowdfunding transaction);
15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012) (requiring crowdfunding intermediaries to enforce
an aggregate investment cap taking into account all crowdfunding purchases
across all issuers). It is not obvious from the language of the JOBS Act that it
imposes both a per-issuer and aggregate investment cap. See Comment Letter
from Michael Doud Gill III to the SEC (Jan. 22, 2014), SEC File No. S7-0913 (discussing ambiguity in the statute) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). But commentators interpret it in this manner. See, e.g., C. Steven
Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40
SEC. REG. L. J. 194, 200–01 (identifying the per-issuer and aggregate investment
limits).
11. See infra notes 125–27 and accompanying text (explaining calculation
of the investment cap). The example assumes that the investor’s annual income
does not exceed $250,000 annually.
12. Wiktionary defines mad money as “[a] sum of money, often relatively
small in amount, kept in reserve to use for impulsive, frivolous purposes.” Mad
Money, WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mad_money (last visited Nov.
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investments, similar to asset-allocation strategies promoted by
professional investment advisors.13 Despite their inauspicious
introduction to federal securities law through the mostly flawed
JOBS Act, this Article argues that investment caps should play a
far larger role than they currently do in private placement
regulation.
Beyond any single reform proposal, it is worthwhile to think
through investment caps because the exercise requires one to
confront a surprising gap in legal scholarship. The dominant
theoretical perspective for evaluating the JOBS Act and other
private placement regulations is to seek an elusive “balance”
between capital formation and investor protection.14 But to say
that Congress and the SEC should balance investor protection
and capital formation raises more questions than it answers.
What do we mean by investor protection and why does it
necessarily need to be balanced against, rather than harmonized
with, capital formation?15 Once defined, which mechanisms for
regulating private placements best further the relevant goals?
Private placement regulation, it seems, is in need of firstprinciples analysis. Although legal scholars have written
comprehensively on the theoretical basis for mandatory
disclosure for companies undertaking a registered offering,16 legal
19, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing conventional
investment advice).
14. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 3, at 1738 (“Policymakers continually face
the challenge of effectively balancing the benefits of encouraging small business
formation against the investor protection goals of the securities laws.”);
Sjostrom, supra note 8, at 1143 (“Regulating securities entails balancing
investor protection and capital formation.”); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The
Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s
Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 920 (2011) (“[S]ensible and
successful exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act
must strike an acceptable balance between investor protection and capital
formation.”); Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and
Undiversified, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 302 (1994) (noting “tension” between
capital formation and investor protection).
15. Michael Guttentag recently made important inroads addressing this
question after noting that the concept of investor protection is surprisingly
under-theorized. Guttentag, supra note 9, at 209.
16. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2009)
(suggesting that the economic argument for mandatory disclosure “was probably
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scholarship is surprisingly sparse on fundamental policy issues
affecting a private placement market that currently exceeds a
trillion dollars annually.17 In analyzing investment caps, this
Article frames and begins to address these important issues.
This Article has four parts. Part II puts investment caps in
context by describing the basic structure and goals of federal
securities regulation with emphasis on the goals of capital
formation and investor protection. Investor protection in
particular proves to be a slippery concept.18 Securities law,
including but not limited to private placement regulation, reflects
multiple notions of investor protection. At times, various notions
of investor protection are in conflict with each other and with the
goal of capital formation.
Part III focuses in on the rationale for, and mechanics of,
current private placement exemptions. It describes the smartmoney approaches of: (1) scaled-disclosure to investors,19 and
(2) sorting capable and incapable investors.20 It contrasts these
ubiquitous approaches to the less common approach of containing
the damage of failed investments through investment caps and
similar mechanisms.21
Part IV argues that investment caps should play a bigger
role in private placement regulation. The argument focuses on
the challenges of regulating the wide range of investment
products sold in private placements. For example, scaleddisclosure mechanisms are appealing if we are confident in
regulators’ ability to identify information that is useful across a
wide range of investment products and to a wide range of
investors. But, in fact, investors do not rely on the same type of
information across investment products.22 Similarly, there is a
the most important topic in securities regulation scholarship during the 1980s
and ’90s”).
17. See Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing
Definition of an Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 689 (2008) (describing
the size of the market for private placements).
18. See infra notes 41–43 (discussing the unclear meaning of investor
protection).
19. Infra Part III.B.1.
20. Infra Part III.B.2.
21. See infra Part III.B.3 (describing the distinctive logic of investor caps
and other portfolio mechanisms).
22. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the failure of scaled disclosure).
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strong case for sorting mechanisms if regulators can distinguish
capable from incapable investors. But regulators have
understandably struggled to find an accurate proxy for investor
capabilities that applies across investment contexts.23 (An
investor may be capable with respect to a real estate partnership
but not a high-tech startup.) Investment caps, in contrast, may
function better with incomplete information about investment
contexts.24 A cap can achieve at least some beneficial
diversification and liquidity without extensive information about
the issuer or the purchaser.25
Part V lays out a proposal for making investment caps the
centerpiece of private placement regulation, and addresses likely
objections. Under the proposal, an exemption relying primarily on
investment caps would replace current Regulation D as the
primary mechanism for moderately sized private placement
offerings to individual investors, as opposed to institutional
investors. Although others have recently recommended an
increased role for investment caps, this proposal goes further in
replacing much of the current regulatory apparatus.26
II. The Structure and Goals of Securities Regulation
Evaluating the new regulatory tool of investment caps
requires an understanding of their role in the broader context of
securities regulation and an understanding of the relevant policy
goals. Accordingly, this Part provides a brief overview of the
structure of securities regulation and tries to answer the
surprisingly difficult question of what this regulatory scheme is
designed to achieve.

23. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the failure of sorting).
24. See infra Part IV.C (discussing how investment caps are affected by
regulatory challenges).
25. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the benefits of investment caps).
26. See infra Part V.C (discussing investment caps proposed by legal
scholars and an advisory committee established by the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
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A. Basic Elements of Federal Securities Regulation
Federal securities laws are primarily set out in the Securities
Act of 1933 (the ’33 Act)27 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the ’34 Act),28 and related regulations promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC). These laws
apply to a broad range of investment products, including stock,
stock options, bonds, and more esoteric schemes in which
purchasers hope to profit primarily from the efforts of others.29
The regulatory scheme has three primary features. A
prohibition on fraud provides purchasers with remedies, and
empowers regulators to impose sanctions, if issuers make false
statements while selling securities.30 In addition, individuals and
firms with regular involvement in securities transactions, such as
broker–dealers and investment advisers (referred to as “securities
professionals”), are subject to various licensing requirements and
have special duties to clients.31 Finally, and most central to this
Article, any company selling securities must register the sales
with the SEC and provide investors with extensive disclosure at
the time of sale and on an ongoing basis (referred to as
“mandatory disclosure”), unless the transaction qualifies for a
specific private placement exemption.32
Although mandatory disclosure is considered the hallmark
feature of federal securities law, a great many transactions are in
fact exempt from registration under various private placement
exemptions.33 In fact, registered offerings, such as Twitter’s 2013
initial public offering (IPO), are relatively infrequent occurrences
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2012).
28. Id. §§ 78a–pp (2012).
29. See id. § 77b (defining the term security); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 297–99 (1946) (formulating a test for whether a financial arrangement
constitutes an “investment contract” and therefore a security).
30. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 837–45 (4th ed. 2001) (providing an overview of “weapons in the
federal antifraud arsenal”).
31. See Cable, supra note 4, at 135–47 (describing the regulation of broker–
dealers and investment advisers).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (requiring the registration of securities
transactions); id. § 78m (requiring periodic disclosures).
33. See, e.g., infra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (describing various
exemptions from registration requirements).
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requiring hundreds of pages of disclosures to investors and
millions in fees to lawyers, bankers, and accountants.34 In the
case of smaller transactions, or transactions with a small number
of sophisticated investors, issuers and their lawyers expend
considerable time and effort assuring themselves that private
placement exemptions apply and that full-blown mandatory
disclosure is not triggered.35
Though private placements are exempt from registration and
full-blown mandatory disclosure, they are not exempt from
regulation altogether. In addition to the ever-present prohibition
on fraud, private placement exemptions are subject to various
conditions relating to the offering process, such as requirements
to limit sales to accredited investors, make abbreviated
disclosures, or make filings with the SEC.36
In narrow circumstances, compliance with an investment cap
is one of these conditions to exemption. For example, a company
availing itself of the new crowdfunding exemption must sell its
securities through an SEC-regulated “funding portal,” provide
purchasers with specified information, and limit the amount each
investor purchases in accordance with the investment cap.37
Currently, investment caps are a relatively minor part of private
placement regulation.38
34. See Twitter, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Nov. 6, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/000119312513431301/d564001
d424b4.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (providing over 200 pages of disclosures
to investors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSIDERING AN IPO? THE COSTS OF GOING AND
BEING PUBLIC MAY SURPRISE YOU 5–10, 12–23 (2012), http://www.pwc.com/
en_us/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf (estimating
costs of conducting an IPO and complying with ongoing public company
requirements).
35. See infra note 36 (describing regulatory requirements of private
offering exemptions).
36. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (describing the
accredited investor concept in Rule 506 offerings); infra notes 104–05 and
accompanying text (describing exemptions based on informational
requirements); 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2014) (requiring an issuer to file Form D in
connection with certain exemptions).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012) (providing a crowdfunding exemption
and related investment cap).
38. See supra note 10 (discussing operation of the crowdfunding investment
cap). In addition to the crowdfunding cap, the SEC recently proposed an
investment cap in connection with the new Regulation A+ exemption under the
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B. The Goals: Capital Formation and Investor Protection
At one level, the goals of the regulatory apparatus described
above are easy to identify. Commentators generally agree that
securities laws—including, but not limited to, private placement
regulations—should facilitate capital formation and protect
investors.39 These objectives are so well accepted that they are
now enshrined in the ’33 Act, with Congress instructing the SEC
to consider these dual goals in all rulemaking.40
Despite broad acceptance of these goals, the meanings of and
relationship between investor protection and capital formation
are not always clear. In particular, there is no consensus
regarding the meaning of investor protection. This is somewhat
surprising given the term’s historical pedigree and prevalence in
law and legal scholarship.41 As Michael Guttentag states in one of
the few law review articles addressing the topic: “A fundamental
question about investor protection has been all but ignored: what
are the particular harms that securities regulations are designed
to protect investors from?”42 This subpart looks broadly at
securities regulation (not only at private placement regulations)
to identify philosophies of investor protection and explore their
relationship to securities law’s other goal of capital formation.43
JOBS Act. Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues
Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities and Exchange
Commission Release No. 33-9497 (Dec. 18, 2013), at 50–53.
39. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the “elusive
‘balance’ between capital formation and investor protection”).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (“[T]he Commission shall also consider, in
addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”).
41. See Guttentag, supra note 9, at 208–09 (identifying investor protection
as a central focus of securities laws); Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and
Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 181 (2010) (“The SEC has repeatedly called
investor protection the ‘basic purpose’ of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”).
42. Guttentag, supra note 9, at 209.
43. The organization of this section draws from Guttentag’s very insightful
work but does not follow his analysis precisely. Guttentag divides his discussion
of investor protection into five categories: fraud, an unlevel informational
playing field, investor mistakes, opportunistic behavior by management (agency
costs or “tunneling”), and excessive risk. Id. at 233. This Article addresses
concerns about an unlevel informational playing field under the concept of
populist investor protection and concerns about investor mistakes and excessive
risk primarily under the concept of paternalistic investor protection. For
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1. Capital Formation

The availability of funding for existing and new businesses
contributes to a number of policy goals. For example, proponents
of the venture-capital industry claim impressive effects on
employment.44 Access to capital may also be a key driver of
innovation and, in turn, economic growth.45 Because novel
businesses are not always good candidates for traditional bank
financing, public and private equity markets take on particular
importance for innovative companies.46
These perceived benefits of capital formation, however, do not
fully explain the relationship between capital formation and
securities regulation. Given the market-based orientation of U.S.
securities laws,47 legal scholars have expended significant effort
purposes of this Article’s analysis, tunneling and fraud can be subsumed within
the single category of investor-choice protection because victims of tunneling or
fraud do not get what they bargained for and even those not directly victimized
may withdraw from the market and forego otherwise beneficial transactions if
tunneling or fraud are prevalent. For a discussion of fraud, see infra Parts
III.A.1, III.A.2, IV.B.3, and IV.C.
44. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy,
Yesterday’s Startups, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 209
(2013) (discussing the job-creation claims of the venture-capital industry).
45. See ROBERT COOTER, SOLOMON’S KNOT: HOW LAW CAN END THE POVERTY
OF NATIONS 27–38 (2012) (explaining that economic growth requires the difficult
task of combining ideas with capital).
46. See Cable, supra note 4, at 121 (discussing why startup companies
struggle to obtain bank financing). Despite the prevalence of capital formation
as a policy goal, there is a theoretical question of whether capital formation is
always beneficial. The dot-com bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s, for
example, was a time of robust capital formation but is now viewed as a period of
“irrational exuberance.” BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 80–98 (2011). To
some observers, what matters most from a policy perspective is allocative
efficiency—ensuring that the most promising projects receive funding in
amounts and at prices that reflect their superior prospects. See FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 280 (1991). And some observers question whether improving the operation
of stock markets in fact has much effect on the allocation of resources in the
economy. See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 2.2.2
(3d ed. 2010) (citing sources on both sides of the debate); Lynn Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing
and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 618 (1998) (identifying
allocative efficiency as a common goal of securities regulation but questioning
actual effects of securities regulation on resource allocation).
47. U.S. securities law reflects what Easterbrook and Fischel refer to as a
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in considering why regulation is necessary to achieve the goal of
capital formation.48 Much of this scholarship has focused on a
central feature of U.S. securities law: mandatory disclosure.49
The predominant explanation for a baseline rule of
mandatory disclosure is that markets would, if left unregulated,
produce less than the optimal amount of disclosure for investors.
This argument starts by recognizing that investment
transactions are plagued by information asymmetry—
entrepreneurs have information that they do not want to
communicate to investors or that they have trouble
communicating credibly. Information asymmetry impedes
otherwise beneficial transactions in several respects. First, it
increases agency costs because the information imbalance in
favor of the entrepreneur gives him or her more chances to
engage in opportunistic behavior.50 Second, difficulty in verifying
information makes purchasers of securities susceptible to fraud
(intentional
misrepresentation).51
Finally,
information
asymmetry leads to a lemons problem. Unable to distinguish good
projects from bad, investors are forced to discount all
opportunities, the most promising projects are underfunded, and
some savvy investors withdraw from the market.52

“dominant principle” that “anyone willing to disclose the right things can sell or
buy whatever he wants at whatever price the market will sustain.”
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 277.
48. See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 1031 (describing efforts by legal
scholars to explain the rationale behind mandatory disclosure).
49. See infra notes 50–59 (citing examples from this sizable literature).
50. See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure
Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 133–36 (2004)
(discussing the relationship between disclosure and agency costs).
51. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 280–81 (discussing how
difficulty in verifying information about securities enables misstatements by
issuers). Though it seems uncontroversial that information asymmetry
increases susceptibility to fraud, it is not as clear that mandatory disclosure is
effective in fighting fraud. See Michael D. Guttentag et al., Brandeis’ Policeman:
Results from a Laboratory Experiment on How to Prevent Corporate Fraud, 5 J.
EMP. LEGAL STUD. 244, 250–52, 273 (2008) (noting the “indirect” and “subtle”
relationship between mandatory disclosure and fraud mitigation, and
presenting evidence that mandatory disclosure does mitigate fraud).
52. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 280 (explaining the
effects of information asymmetry).
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The existence of information asymmetry, however, does not
quite explain why disclosure should be mandatory. After all,
investors can (and often do) demand disclosure on their own, and
entrepreneurs can (and often do) provide disclosure voluntarily to
encourage investment.53 Why would a mandatory disclosure
system provide information at a level, or of a type, that is
superior to this voluntary system?
One problem is that disclosure practices may generate
positive externalities. For example, a disclosure system that is
standard or uniform across issuers—asking all issuers to disclose
the same types of information at the same time—has distinct
advantages. Investors can use standardized information to more
easily compare competing projects.54 In addition, a standardized
system may avoid duplicative efforts to ascertain relevant
information because disclosure standards reflect past learning
about which types of information prove effective in evaluating
projects.55 Despite these advantages of standardized disclosure
practices, no individual investor is perfectly motivated to bear the
costs of creating and enforcing such a system because it
potentially creates benefits for other investors, and no individual
entrepreneur is perfectly motivated to bear the costs of creating
such a system because it may create benefits for competitors.56
If the market does not produce standardized disclosure at
optimal levels, regulatory action may be warranted.57 A
53. See id. at 280–83 (discussing how securities markets would operate
without legal intervention).
54. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 685–87 (1984) (discussing the
benefits of standardized disclosure requirements).
55. See id. at 681–82 (discussing duplicative search efforts by investors).
56. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 290–92, 303
(discussing third-party effects of disclosure); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339–45 (1999) (discussing third-party
effects of disclosure); Guttentag, supra note 50, at 136–38 (discussing thirdparty effects of disclosure).
57. Whether the current mandatory disclosure scheme is effectively
designed to achieve this goal is the subject of vigorous debate. See Guttentag,
supra note 50, at 169–90 (reviewing a voluminous literature on mandatory
disclosure and arguing that the current system requires disclosure of the wrong
types of information); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373–80 (1998) (arguing
that an “issuer choice” regime, where issuers could opt into different degrees of
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lawmaker could try to address this market failure by:
(1) developing and mandating disclosure requirements directly, or
(2) delegating the function to a group of professionals. U.S.
securities laws are a mix of these approaches. Lawmakers
directly specify the nonfinancial information that issuers must
disclose before publicly selling securities.58 For the most part,
lawmakers have delegated oversight of financial disclosure to the
accounting profession.59 By requiring issuers to make the
disclosures recommended by the accounting profession, and by
vesting accountants with the exclusive right to develop the
standards, lawmakers create incentives to develop and maintain
disclosure standards that might otherwise be under-produced.
In sum, laissez-faire policies may not achieve optimal levels
of capital formation. Investment transactions are plagued by
information asymmetry, and market actors may have high
transactions costs in trying to contract for optimal disclosure.
Mandatory disclosure can be understood as an effort to give
investors what they would contract for in the absence of those
transactions costs.
2. Investor-Choice Protection
One philosophy of investor protection focuses on facilitating
mutually beneficial investment transactions by mitigating
information asymmetries and the associated problems of fraud,
agency costs, and lemons market.60 Analogizing to other product
disclosure, would be more effective).
58. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2014) (mandating disclosure of information
about an issuer’s business, property, management, and governance); id. § 239.11
(requiring this information to be included in the prospectus for an initial public
offering).
59. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (requiring an issuer to provide investors
with financial information in the form required by Regulation S-X under the ’33
and ’34 Acts); id. § 210 (requiring that the financial information be audited by
certified public accountants).
60. See Bradford, supra note 3, at 98 (“The SEC has long seen its mission
as ‘investor protection in the sense of remedying information asymmetries and
rooting out fraud . . . .’” (quoting Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate
Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL.
L. REV. 975, 1005)); supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (describing the
effects of information asymmetry).
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markets,61 removing these barriers to efficient investment
transactions maximizes investors’ surplus. I call this policy goal
“investor-choice protection” because it focuses on effectuating
investor preferences.
In the context of publicly traded companies, this type of
protection is achieved through the same mandatory disclosure
system that promotes capital formation. This scheme arguably
protects investors in the sense of mitigating information
asymmetries and enabling investors to buy the securities they
want at the price they deem appropriate.62 For publicly traded
stock, the protections extend to even those investors who cannot
themselves understand the disclosures, because information is
rapidly digested by the market and communicated through
price.63
Despite frequent claims that investor protection and capital
formation need to be balanced—suggesting that they are in
tension—the two goals are harmonized under this notion of
investor protection. Capital formation and investor-choice
protection are two sides of the same coin—reducing barriers to
matching investor preferences with available investment
opportunities. Table 1 summarizes the strong relationship
between capital formation and investor-choice protection.
3. Paternalistic Investor Protection
Investor-choice protection is not the only sense in which
securities laws protect investors. Features of U.S. securities law
described in this section reflect an alternative notion that I refer
to as “paternalistic investor protection.” Rather than maximizing
investor choice, these securities regulations appear designed to
61. See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text (discussing why it is
appropriate to analogize to other product markets).
62. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 182 (describing a theory of investor
protection whereby “disclosure protects investors by giving them the tools to
look out for themselves”).
63. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 297 (noting that “[a]s
long as informed traders engage in a sufficient amount of searching for
information and bargains, market prices will reflect all publicly available
information”); Schwartz, supra note 41, at 181–85, 201–08 (discussing, but
ultimately questioning, market prices as a form of investor protection).
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save investors from their own bad decisions.64 Paternalistic
approaches, such as “merit review” of proposed stock terms, were
prominent in state securities laws that preceded the ’33 and ’34
Acts.65 Although the ’33 and ’34 Acts preempted most state-level
regulation of securities transactions, paternalistic approaches do
survive in subtle ways.66
For example, the regulatory framework for securities
professionals, such as broker–dealers and investment advisers,
imposes duties on these intermediaries when recommending
investments. Securities professionals are potentially liable if they
recommend transactions that are deemed “unsuitable” to a
client.67 Although the client’s subjective investment goals are one
element of suitability, the intermediary’s recommendation must
also be appropriate in light of the client’s financial resources and
age.68 This objective notion of suitability imposes on some

64. See Guttentag, supra note 9, at 229–32 (explaining that “[t]here is less
evidence in the historical record that federal securities regulations were enacted
for the purpose of protecting investors from their own unwise investment
decisions than might be expected”). Guttentag speculates that prominent
advocates for the ’33 Act and the ’34 Act may have wanted to avoid blaming
everyday investors for the harms suffered in the stock market crash. Id.
65. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 308 (giving an historical example of a
Kansas banking commissioner who required banks to report withdraws by
customers so that the commissioner could review potential investments with the
withdrawn funds).
66. See id. (“In reality, [William O.] Douglas’[s] intuition that doses of
paternalism were required for effective regulation has insinuated itself much
more broadly than generally recognized into the federal scheme of securities
regulation.”). Friedman explains that “[t]hrough quasi-private self-regulatory
organizations, the necessary paternalism emerged that Congress was unwilling
to vest in the federal government directly.” Id. Friedman gives the example of
NASD Rules that require approval of underwriting terms in public offerings. Id.
67. See Cable, supra note 4, at 135–47 (describing the regulation of
securities professionals).
68. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. Rule 2111 (2014) (providing that a
broker–dealer is obligated to investigate and base recommendations on the
client’s “investment profile”). A client’s investment profile includes the client’s
“age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk
tolerance, and any other information the customer may disclose to the member
or associated person in connection with such recommendation.” Id. Investment
advisers owe a similar duty to make suitable recommendations based on “the
client’s financial situation and investment objectives.” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 27–28 (2011).
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investors a societal judgment about appropriate levels of financial
risk.
Similarly, the SEC dedicates substantial resources to
“investor education.” Through these educational efforts, the SEC
endorses conventional views of the personal finance industry
regarding appropriate asset allocation, retirement planning, and
diversification. For example, the SEC’s website directs users to a
personal finance calculator that produces a suggested allocation
of investment assets based on the user’s demographic
information.69
Granted, an investor can easily escape these relatively mild
paternalistic interventions.70 An investor need not seek the
advice of a broker–dealer before executing a transaction and can
steer clear of the SEC’s website. But these regulations and
initiatives do represent an effort, way down in the plumbing of
securities regulation, to shape and contain investor preferences
rather than effecting preformed investor choice.
To be clear, paternalistic investor protection is not always in
direct conflict with capital formation or investor-choice
protection. Investors display well-documented cognitive
shortcomings when making financial decisions.71 Some securities
regulations appear designed to quell immediate investor impulses
and provide opportunity for more considered decision-making.
For example, the ’33 Act imposes a waiting period between a
69. See Beginners’ Guide to Asset Allocation, Diversification, and
Rebalancing, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
assetallocation.htm (last visited Nov 19, 2014) (directing the user, under the
section titled, “How to Get Started” to a hyperlinked “online asset allocation
calculator”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The SEC does
state that risk tolerance must be decided by the individual investor. Id. Yet the
asset allocation calculator is not greatly affected by varying the input for risk
tolerance. Id.
70. One could call the SEC’s approach “soft paternalism.” See Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003) (“Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak
and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced
off.”).
71. See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 197, 226–27 (2008) (summarizing various investor biases); Schwartz, supra
note 41, at 204–07 (describing “biases that are thought to impact decision
making in the investment context”); MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 235–52
(categorizing these biases into overconfidence, biased judgments, herding, loss
aversion, and pride and regret).
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public offer of securities and any actual sales.72 Similarly, the ’34
Act requires that tender offers remain open for a specified
number of days so that target shareholders have time to carefully
consider the offer.73 These requirements may impede investor
choice in the sense of checking immediate impulses, but they can
be seen as ultimately enabling investor choice viewed at the time
when cooler heads prevail.74
Paternalistic regulation may also facilitate capital formation
by boosting “investor confidence.” Though a frequently cited
rationale for tightening securities regulations, investor confidence
is, in fact, a nebulous concept with an unproven relationship to
stock market participation.75 In one form, investor confidence
refers to a psychological, and sometimes irrational, sentiment
that retail investors exhibit towards the market.76 We may worry
that unsophisticated investors will ascribe too much importance
to negative experiences or events, and we may therefore try to
72. See Guttentag, supra note 9, at 230.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (2014). A tender offer is an offer by an acquirer to
buy the stock of a publicly traded company directly from shareholders. See
PETER V. LETSOU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 165–68 (2006). It is a common mechanism for a corporate
takeover. Id.
74. Similarly, some legal scholars suggest that legal rules can play a “debiasing” role by combatting cognitive biases and improving decision making. See
Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND
ITS APPLICATIONS 21 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007) (“[L]egal
policy may respond best to such errors [in decision making] . . . by operating
directly on the errors and attempting to help people either to reduce or to
eliminate them.”).
75. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003) (noting that the SEC frequently relies on a
rationale of restoring investor confidence without rigorously defining the
concept or citing empirical evidence that investor confidence affects stock
market participation).
76. See Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
407, 415–20 (2002) (discussing the relationship between investor confidence and
stock market participation, emphasizing the psychology of retail investors and
factors affecting their long-term trust in markets). But, as Stout recognizes,
reference to investor confidence does not require a paternalistic mindset—we
may simply recognize that rational investors will shrewdly withdraw from a
market plagued by insurmountable information asymmetry. See id. at 410–15
(discussing the rational-actor model); supra note 52 and accompanying text
(considering how information asymmetry may cause some investors to withdraw
from the market).
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save investors from making mistakes so that they do not
irrationally shun the market in the future.77 In other words,
saving investors from themselves may be important to
maintaining robust public equities markets (capital formation).
At another level, however, paternalistic protection is in
tension with capital formation and investor-choice protection. For
example, an investor near retirement age may genuinely prefer to
invest in a high-risk startup company. That choice does not
necessarily indicate a defect in the investor’s decision-making
process, even if it defies the conventional views of the personal
finance industry.78 To the extent securities regulations impede
that investment, a potential source of financing for the startup is
eliminated, and the goals of capital formation and investor-choice
protection are stifled.
One might think this concern is overstated to the extent
securities are fungible cash flow rights and obligations. In theory,
if securities laws restrict a particular investor from purchasing a
particular security, (1) the company could turn to other investors
or alternative financing sources and (2) the investor could obtain
similar cash flow rights, with similar risk and return
characteristics, from a different financial product. In some
contexts, this may be true. Established companies do have a wide
variety of financing sources available, including public equities,
bond issuances, trade credit, and traditional bank financing.79
Likewise, knowledgeable investors can construct a variety of cash
flow combinations through investments in publicly traded stocks,
index funds, mutual funds, private equity funds, life insurance
products, real estate investments, and so on.80 In some cases, any
77. See Stout, supra note 76, at 430 (“Rather than dismiss the
‘unsophisticated investor’ as the weak animal that must sadly but necessarily be
culled out of the investing herd in order to improve the species, perhaps we
should pay close attention to his care and feeding.”).
78. Cf. Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: The
Retirement Savings Crisis and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 39–40) (considering, but
ultimately rejecting, arguments for respecting unconventionally high-risk
investment strategies in retirement plans).
79. See Stout, supra note 76, at 436 (suggesting that bear markets have
limited impact on well-run companies because they can finance operations from
sources other than equities markets).
80. See infra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing commonly owned
assets).
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particular paternalistic intervention may not move the needle in
terms of capital formation and satisfying investor preferences.
But in other contexts, neither financing sources nor
investment opportunities are so fungible. Businesses with limited
operating history have difficulty accessing public equities
markets,81 bank financing,82 and in many cases venture capital.83
Likewise, some investors gain their competitive advantage
through investing within a narrow area of technical expertise or
within networks of personal or business relationships.84 In
addition, an investor may not be interested in cash flow rights
alone. Investors may select investments based on special tax
attributes or even for nonfinancial reasons, such as enthusiasm
for a particular technology or community.85
In short, paternalistic protection does not have to be
inconsistent with the goal of capital formation, but it often is.
Table 1 summarizes this ambiguous relationship.

81. See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties
that small issuers face in complying with the mandatory disclosure scheme that
accompanies public equities markets); Going Public, ENTREPRENEUR,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/81394 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014)
(suggesting that a company should have a valuation of $100 million to be an
IPO candidate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance
Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private
Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 869–70 (2005) (“Because of the
way that rapid-growth start-ups are structured, they are generally not eligible
for such commercial bank loans.”).
83. See Private Equity for Small Firms: The Importance of the Participating
Securities Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 109th Cong.
37–67 (2005) (statement of Colin C. Blaydon, Dir., Center for Private Equity and
Entrepreneurship, and Susan L. Preston, Entrepreneur-in-Residence, Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation) [hereinafter Private Equity] (discussing the
“funding gap” that startups face after exhaustion of personal funds and the
typical $5 million minimum investment amount of venture-capital funds).
84. See COOTER, supra note 45, at 27–38 (discussing the importance of
relational finance to entrepreneurship); Cable, supra note 4, at 130 (discussing
the investment practices of angel investors).
85. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel
Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1437–39 (2008) (discussing nonfinancial
motivations of angel investors).
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4. Populist Investor Protection

A third notion of investor protection prioritizes participation
of retail, as opposed to institutional, investors in securities
markets.86 A number of securities law requirements appear to
have been designed to maintain a “level playing field” among
investors of varying wealth, sophistication, and access to
information. For example, Regulation FD under the ’34 Act
prohibits publicly traded companies from revealing information to
professional securities analysts without simultaneous disclosure
to the public.87 Similarly, insider-trading rules are sometimes
justified in terms of informational equality between company
insiders and retail investors.88 I call this policy goal “populist
investor protection.”
Like paternalistic investor protection, populist investor
protection is not always in tension with the goal of capital
formation. All other things being equal, broad participation in a
market should improve its performance by increasing liquidity.
At other times, however, populist investor protection has a
more distributive thrust that may be in tension with capital
formation. Policymakers may value equal access to investment
opportunities more than economic efficiency. For instance, some
legal scholars argue that insider trading, if permitted, would in
fact improve the accuracy and efficiency of stock markets and
therefore assist high-quality issuers.89 But policymakers may still
prohibit insiders from trading on nonpublic information in the
86. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3389 (2013) (critiquing the exclusion of retail investors from
the private placement market); Langevoort, supra note 16; Stout, supra note 76,
at 430 (“Rather than dismiss the ‘unsophisticated investor’ as the weak animal
that must sadly but necessarily be culled out of the investing herd in order to
improve the species, perhaps we should pay close attention to his care and
feeding.”).
87. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.100–.103 (2014).
88. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1968)
(concluding that corporate insiders must either disclose material nonpublic
information or abstain from trading).
89. See M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 503, 507–08 (2011) (summarizing the views of Henry Manne in INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET). But see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 46, at
2.2.2 (citing sources disputing the assertion that insider trading rules improve
accuracy of prices).
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name of fairness to retail investors. Table 1 summarizes the
ambiguous relationship between populist protection and capital
formation.
III. Private Placement Exemptions: Why and How?
A. Why Private Placement Exemptions?
Based on the discussion above, one might wonder why there
are any exemptions to a baseline rule of mandatory disclosure.
Mandatory disclosure seems uniquely suited to meet all of the
goals of securities law described above. By helping investors
overcome information asymmetry, these regulations can be
characterized as promoting capital formation and investor-choice
protection by helping match investors and issuers.90 Mandatory
disclosure also squares with more paternalistic and populist
notions of investor protection to the extent that even
unsophisticated investors benefit from complex information as
communicated through price.91
So, as a policy matter, why are some transactions exempt
from these beneficial mandatory disclosure rules? When would
the costs of mandatory disclosure outweigh its considerable
benefits? To answer these questions, it is useful to think about
the types of investment opportunities and investors typical of
private placements.
In terms of investment attributes, consider startup
companies with novel products or business plans.92 In their initial
stages, these companies typically seek “seed funding” in amounts
ranging from $500,000 to $5 million.93 The costs of complying
with a mandatory disclosure regime, however, are somewhat
90. See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing capital formation and investorchoice protection).
91. See supra Parts II.B.3–4 (discussing paternalistic and populist investor
protection).
92. This is by no means the only or even predominant type of private
placement. But the name of the JOBS Act, for example, demonstrates the
central role that high-growth startups play in thinking about private placement
regulation.
93. See Private Equity, supra note 83 (discussing the financing needs of
startups prior to eligibility for venture capital).
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fixed.94 Engaging an accountant to perform an audit in connection
with a $500,000 offering may cost more than one percent of the
amount it cost to perform an audit in connection with a $50
million offering.95 The costs of a comprehensive mandatory
disclosure system could easily outweigh the entire value of a
highly uncertain project in its relative infancy. Also, mandatory
disclosure systems tend to emphasize historical facts over
projections and future plans, and so provide little benefit to a
company with limited or no operating history.96
Of course, private placement exemptions are not limited to
startup companies, so it is useful to consider how investor
attributes may also affect the costs and benefits of mandatory
disclosure. Some categories of investors may not value mandatory
disclosure because they benefit from a substitute means of
overcoming information asymmetry. An investor may have a
relationship to the issuer or its personnel that mitigates typical
information imbalances and resulting agency costs—for example
an employment relationship. Alternatively, an investor may have
superior technical or financial knowledge or experience that
results in above average ability to formulate disclosure requests,
evaluate information, and negotiate favorable investment terms.
Venture-capital investors, for example, likely benefit from a
number of these substitute protections. Silicon Valley is a closeknit market with many repeat players, so reputational
considerations may limit opportunistic behavior by issuers.97
Venture-capital investors tend to focus their investments in

94. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 278 (discussing how
mandatory disclosure laws may favor large issuers because they are not
generally scaled).
95. See Chris Wand, Do Venture Capitalists Demand Audited Financials?,
ASK
THE
VC,
http://www.askthevc.com/wp/archives/2008/02/do-venturecapitalists-demand-audited-financials.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014)
(providing cost estimates for audited financials) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 671 (stating that
many of the costs of disclosure are the same regardless of the size of the firm or
offering).
96. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 305 (explaining that
mandatory disclosure obligations emphasize objective historical facts).
97. See In re Trados Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 1512-VCL, 2013 WL 4511262,
at *28 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013) (noting the close-knit nature of the Silicon Valley
environment).
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particular industries where they have some technical expertise.98
And venture-capital investors have developed standardized
investment contracts particularly suited to the information
asymmetry, agency costs, and uncertainty inherent in startup
company investments.99
In sum, for certain types of transactions, the costs of
mandatory disclosure may be disproportionate to the size of the
contemplated transaction. And certain types of investors, who
have substitute means of protection, may not value the benefits of
mandatory disclosure. As a result, some transactions are
exempted from the full-blown mandatory disclosure system and
are instead subject to alternative regulatory mechanisms.
B. How Private Placements Are Regulated
At first glance, private placement regulation can appear too
fragmented for precise analysis. The contours of private
placement exemptions are defined through a patchwork of
legislation, judicial interpretation, and rulemaking by the SEC.
For example, § 4(a)(2) of the ’33 Act provides a statutory
exemption for sales “not involving any public offering.”100 Because
this statutory exemption provides issuers with almost no
guidance, courts stepped in to develop multi-factor tests
delineating private (i.e., exempt) versus public offerings under
the statute.101 Addressing concerns that this case law was overly
subjective and ad hoc, the SEC has developed safe harbor
98. See Cable, supra note 44, at 238 (“In 2011, nearly 80 percent of
V[enture] C[apital] investment was made in six industry sectors: software (24
percent), biotechnology (17 percent), industrial/energy (12 percent), medical
devices and equipment (10 percent), media and entertainment (8 percent), and
IT services (8 percent).” (citing statistics from the National Venture Capital
Association)(footnote omitted)).
99. See Cable, supra note 4, at 120–26 (describing standard venture-capital
investment contracts, drawing on the work of Ronald Gilson, George Triantis,
and others); Jesse M Fried & Mina Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 983, 989–90 (2006) (reviewing
arguments for how preferred stock and board control reduce entrepreneur
opportunism).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012).
101. See infra note 106–110 and accompanying text (discussing case law
under § 4(a)(2)).
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exemptions associated with § 4(a)(2), such as Rule 506 of
Regulation D.102 Other SEC rulemaking is based on alternative
statutory authority, such as § 3(b) of the ’33 Act, which states
that the SEC “may from time to time through its rules and
regulations” create exemptions for securities issuances of $5
million or less.103
Stepping back from this patchwork of legal authorities,
however, one can see in private placement regulations three
primary mechanisms for protecting investors: scaled disclosure,
sorting, and portfolio mechanisms. To date, scaled disclosure and
sorting are the dominant mechanisms. Investor caps are a
relatively rare example of a portfolio mechanism.
1. Scaled-Disclosure Mechanisms
Private placement exemptions may be conditioned on
disclosure of specified information, though less than what is
required for a registered offering. I call these requirements
“scaled-disclosure mechanisms.” For example, Regulation A
allows for offerings of up to $5 million if the issuer provides
financial statements prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and a disclosure document
containing nonfinancial information similar to, but less
comprehensive than, what would be contained in a prospectus for
a registered public offering.104 Similarly, the most popular private
placement exemption, Rule 506, requires issuers to deliver this
same information, but with audited financial statements, to any
purchasers who do not meet certain wealth or income
standards.105

102. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014) (enumerating an exemption for limited
offers and sales without regard to the dollar amount of the offering).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77c.
104. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263. For a good overview of the Regulation A
exemption and the impediments to its more frequent use, see Rutheford B.
Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Business’ Search for a “Moderate Capital,”
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 101–12 (2006).
105. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
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2. Sorting Mechanisms

Other exemptions require that issuers sell or offer securities
to only those investors who meet specified criteria. I call these
requirements “sorting mechanisms.” In some cases, sorting
mechanisms seek to identify investors with special relationships
to the issuer that may serve as substitutes for registration and
mandatory disclosure. For example, case law interpreting
§ 4(a)(2) often emphasizes the relationship between the issuer
and investors. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,106 the seminal case
under that exemption, the Court considered an issuer’s sale of
stock to its employees.107 The Court held that a broad offering of
stock to a wide range of employees did not qualify for the
exemption, and the Court implied that a narrower offering to
high-level executives, with meaningful access to information
about the issuer, would qualify for the exemption.108 Subsequent
judicial opinions similarly state that an offering is more likely
exempt when there is a “substantial preexisting relationship”
between the issuer and the offerees.109 The SEC has incorporated
the concept of a substantial preexisting relationship into several
of its safe-harbor exemptions.110
In other cases, investors are deemed qualified because of
superior capability in assessing investments. The apparent
financial sophistication of offerees has been an important factor
in case law under § 4(a)(2).111 Where courts perceive investors as
106.
107.
108.
109.

346 U.S. 119 (1935).
See id. at 120.
See id. at 125–26.
See Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38
EMORY L.J. 67, 71–75, 104–09 (1989) (discussing the evolution of the “preexisting relationship” requirement).
110. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014) (prohibiting sales to nonaccredited
investors by “general solicitation”). Through no-action letters, the SEC has
suggested that the best way to avoid a general solicitation is to limit offers to
persons with whom the issuer has a preexisting relationship. Cable, supra note
4, at 133–34. The SEC defines a preexisting relationship as one that is in place
prior to the offering and that “would enable the issuer (or a person acting on its
behalf) to be aware of the financial circumstances or sophistication of the
persons with whom the relationship exists or that otherwise are of some
substance and duration.” Id. (quoting Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55694 (Dec. 4, 1985)).
111. See id. at 76 (discussing factors that courts consider in analyzing
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having enough knowledge about financial matters to request and
assess relevant information from the issuer, an offering is more
likely to be considered private and therefore exempt.112
In an effort to provide issuers with more certainty than the
§ 4(a)(2) case law, the SEC has incorporated proxies for investor
sophistication into its safe-harbor exemptions. The “accredited
investor” standard is the most prominent proxy for investor
sophistication.113 To qualify as an accredited investor, an
individual must have annual income of at least $200,000 per year
($300,000 if filing jointly with a spouse) or net assets of at least
$1 million (excluding equity in a primary residence).114 Although
the SEC’s safe-harbor exemptions are not, in theory, limited to
accredited investors, an issuer receives a number of important
benefits by limiting an offering to accredited investors. Under the
popular Rule 506 exemption, an issuer is not required to provide
audited financial statements or other specified disclosure to
accredited investors and may engage in a general solicitation if
all purchasers are accredited.115

§ 4(a)(2)).
112. See id. at 75–84 (examining case law that focuses on investor
sophistication).
113. See Campbell, supra note 14, at 929 (discussing the high rate at which
issuers rely on exemptions requiring accredited-investor status); Friedman,
supra note 14, at 299–300 (discussing the origins of the accredited–investor
standard).
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (providing definitions for Regulation D).
115. See id. § 230.502 (setting forth disclosure requirements for Regulation
D); supra note 4 (discussing recent reforms that permit general solicitation if all
investors are accredited). Relief from providing audited financial statements is a
particularly important advantage because a startup company is unlikely to have
audited financials and investors are unlikely to value them. See THERESE H.
MAYNARD & DANA M. WARREN, BUSINESS PLANNING: FINANCING THE START-UP
BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING 234 (2010) (discussing the burdens
of required disclosure to non-accredited investors). Accordingly, Rule 506
offerings including nonaccredited investors are relatively rare. See Jennifer
Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 993, 1002 n.56 (2012) (discussing a recent study of Regulation D offerings
indicating that 90% included only accredited investors).
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3. Portfolio Mechanisms (Including Investment Caps)
Even before the JOBS Act introduced investment caps, some
aspects of federal private placement regulation subtly reflected
an alternative method of protecting investors. Instead of
emphasizing receipt of particular information or perceived
capabilities, these mechanisms focus on the overall financial
condition of the purchaser. I call these “portfolio mechanisms.”
For example, one commentator suggests regulators did not
initially view wealth standards, such as accredited investor
status, as proxies for investment capability.116 Instead, wealth
standards initially ensured that purchasers had adequate
liquidity to hold presumably illiquid securities for a long
period.117 The concept was not that wealthy investors had the
ability to reduce risk through self-help but rather that they could
absorb risk due to their general financial situation.118
The ban on general solicitation, which prohibits public
solicitation of investors under several exemptions,119 has also
acted in part as a portfolio mechanism because it channels sales
efforts through broker–dealers.120 Under SEC no-action letters
interpreting the ban, broker–dealers are granted significantly
more leeway than issuers in locating investors.121 Therefore, an
issuer who wants to cast a relatively wide net in searching for
investors may be motivated to sell through a broker–dealer.122 As
discussed above, broker–dealers must determine that
investments are suitable based on the purchaser’s overall
financial condition.123
116. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 299–310 (discussing the role of wealth
standards in Rule 146, which was a precursor to Rule 506).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See supra notes 4, 110 and accompanying text (discussing the ban on
general solicitation).
120. See Cable, supra note 4, at 135 (explaining how SEC regulations
encourage use of intermediaries).
121. See id. (discussing SEC no-action letters).
122. See id. Of course, the ban on general solicitation may not affect issuer
practices to the same extent now that it has been lifted for sales to accredited
investors.
123. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (providing an overview of
a broker–dealer’s obligation to determine that recommendations are suitable
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The investment cap contained in the JOBS Act’s new
crowdfunding exemption is a more explicit example of a portfolio
mechanism. Under the new exemption, the amount each
individual can invest in crowdfunding transactions is capped
according to the investor’s net worth and annual income.124 For
example, an investor with a net worth of $75,000 (and annual
income at or below that level) can invest a maximum of $3,750 in
crowdfunding offerings annually. An investor with a net worth of
$750,000 (and annual income at or below that amount) can invest
a maximum of $75,000 in crowdfunding offerings annually.125 No
investor may purchase more than $100,000 in crowdfunding
offerings annually regardless of wealth.126 Investment caps are
relatively common at the state level but new to federal law.127
Though an investment cap may not reduce the risk that any
individual investment will fail, it may reduce an investor’s overall
exposure to financial risk by forcing modest diversification. For
example, assume lawmakers enact a registration exemption with
a simple investment cap that prevents any single purchaser from
based on a potential investor’s investment profile).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012) (requiring issuers to adhere to an
investment cap taking into account only sales from that issuer); id. § 77d-1(a)(8)
(requiring crowdfunding intermediaries to ensure that a purchaser stays within
an aggregate annual limit across all crowdfunding transactions); supra note 10
(discussing the aggregate annual limit).
125. See id. § 77d(a)(6)(B). The language enacted by Congress is ambiguous
regarding how the cap is calculated. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No.
33-9470, Exchange Act Release No. 34-70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428, 66433 (Nov.
5, 2013). The SEC takes the position that if either annual income or net worth is
at or above $100,000, then the investor may purchase an amount equal to 10%
of the measure that exceeded $100,000. Id. at 66433–34. But if both annual
income and net worth are below $100,000, the SEC takes the position that the
investor is limited to 5% of annual income or net worth (whichever is higher).
Id.
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(c) (providing investment limits at lower income and
net asset levels).
127. The investment cap in the JOBS Act resembles a provision of the
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption adopted by several states. See, e.g., WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 460-44A-505 (2014) (imposing an investment cap on certain
limited offering exemptions). This exemption allows sales to nonaccredited
investors as long as the investment is suitable to the investor. Id. § 460-44A505(2)(c)(i). An investment is deemed suitable if the investment amount does
not exceed 10% of the investor’s net worth. Id. The SEC recently proposed an
investment cap in connection with recent revisions to Regulation A. Supra note
38.
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investing more than 10% of his or her net worth in a single
company. If an angel investor with a $1 million net worth would
otherwise invest $200,000 in a single startup, he or she might be
forced by the investment cap to divide the investment amount
over multiple startups or look to other types of investments (such
as publicly traded stock or mutual funds). It is a basic tenant of
corporate finance theory that diversification can reduce aggregate
financial risk to an investor while maintaining returns.128 Just
how effective diversification is at reducing risk depends on the
nature of all assets held by the investor and their tendency to rise
and fall in value at the same time (covariance), a topic reserved
for Part IV.C below.129
In addition to these diversification benefits, investment caps
can mitigate risks associated with illiquidity. Securities issued in
private placements are difficult to re-sell due, in part, to
regulatory factors. When an issuer sells a security pursuant to an
exemption from registration, only that initial sale is exempt.130
Secondary transactions—resale by the investor to a third party—
are not automatically exempt and so investments sold in private
placements are not eligible for most secondary markets, such as
traditional stock exchanges where buyers and sellers are easily
matched.131 As a result, an investor in a private placement must
be prepared to hold the security for an extended period,
potentially affecting his or her ability to meet current obligations.
Investment caps can help ensure that a single, illiquid
investment does not dominate an investor’s portfolio.
In sum, investment caps and other portfolio mechanisms rest
on a different logic than scaled disclosure or sorting. As stated in
the introduction, scaled disclosure and sorting are smart-money
approaches because they try to reduce the risk of a failed
investment by mitigating information asymmetry (making
128. See infra notes 194–202 and accompanying text (discussing investment
caps within the context of diversification and investment volatility).
129. See infra notes 190–97 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to
which diversification reduces volatility).
130. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2014) (stating that securities sold in
Regulation D offerings are restricted securities).
131. See id. § 230.144 (describing limited circumstances in which a
purchaser of securities can re-sell restricted securities without being deemed an
underwriter).
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investors smarter) and limiting the market to capable (smart)
investors.132 In contrast, investor caps and other portfolio
mechanisms assume that there is a substantial risk of failed
investment and try to limit the consequences for the purchaser’s
overall financial condition.133 I refer to this as a mad-money
approach because it anticipates and allows risky investments but
only within parameters.134
IV. Evaluating the Mechanisms: In Theory and Practice
The smart-money approaches of scaled disclosure and sorting
currently dominate private placement regulation. This Part seeks
to understand why by first articulating a theoretical case for this
current approach. But this Part goes on to identify practical
considerations that seriously undermine the effectiveness of
scaled disclosure and sorting. Taking these practical
considerations into effect, the mad-money approach of investment
caps becomes more appealing.
A. The Theoretical Appeal of Disclosure and Sorting
(Smart Money)
To understand the current state of private placement
regulation, it is helpful to first give smart-money approaches the
132. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (explaining this Article’s
terminology of smart money).
133. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text (discussing the
diversification and liquidity goals of investment caps).
134. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The distinction between
smart-money approaches and investment caps bears some resemblance to
Stephen Choi’s distinction between regulating investments and regulating
investors. Mercer Bullard, On Regulating Investors: The JOBS Act and the
Accredited Investor Standard 4–6 (July 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2468031 (discussing the logic of
investment caps) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Choi has
argued that regulators should regulate investors rather than issuers, with
unsophisticated investors being limited to passive index funds. Stephen Choi,
Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Approach, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
279, 300–01 (2000). While this focus on investor portfolio construction bears
some resemblance to this Article’s analysis, Choi’s proposals rely heavily on
sorting mechanisms that this Article disfavors. Id.
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benefit of the doubt by assuming they are effective in achieving
their objectives. This Part therefore assumes that scaled
disclosure provides information that investors actually value and
that sorting mechanisms effectively distinguish capable from
incapable investors. This Part then compares these mechanisms
to an investment cap that is effective in achieving its objectives of
encouraging diversification and liquidity. This comparison
reveals that smart-money approaches may have comparative
advantages over investment caps in this hypothetical setting.
1. Smart Money in a Perfect World
At first blush, scaled disclosure seems a sensible response to
the special attributes of private placements described above. If
there are fixed costs to mandatory disclosure that renders it
impractical for smaller transactions,135 perhaps the amount of
disclosure can simply be adjusted. Through properly calibrated
disclosure requirements, regulators could try to specify helpful,
standardized disclosure requirements that individual market
participants benefit from but lack adequate incentives to create
and maintain.136 Such a regulatory scheme would advance capital
formation and investor-choice protection in much the same way
as the full-blown mandatory disclosure scheme for registered
offerings.137
But even if disclosure requirements can be scaled down in
this manner—something this Article questions below—disclosure
is unlikely to be the whole answer in the context of private
placements. Unlike securities sold in registered offerings,
securities sold in private placements are illiquid and cannot be
re-sold through an exchange such as Nasdaq or NYSE.138 In the
rare instances in which secondary markets for private placement
135. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text (discussing the fixed
costs of mandatory disclosure).
136. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (identifying third-party
effects of mandatory disclosure).
137. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between capital formation and investor-choice protection).
138. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (discussing limitations
on resales of restricted securities).
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securities have emerged, the effectiveness of those markets in
accurately pricing securities is questionable.139
This illiquidity has significant implications for private
placement regulation. One of the primary justifications for the
mandatory disclosure system is that experts will quickly digest
information and communicate it to the public markets through
price.140 But without a public market, each investor must
independently assess a company’s disclosures.141 Given the
evidence that individual investors either exhibit flawed decisionmaking or simply lack resources to process voluminous
information,142 scaled disclosure alone is problematic.
One problem, of course, is that vulnerable investors may be
misled or may misconstrue information and make investments
that they misunderstand. In that case, it is debatable whether
those investors are satisfying their preferences in any meaningful
way.143
139. For instance, Facebook stock traded on secondary markets (SharesPost
and SecondMarket) prior to the company’s IPO. ROBERT BARTLETT, BERKELEY
LAW, POST-JOBS ACT CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN “PRIVATE” SECONDARY
TRADING MARKETS 17 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum111512materials-bartlett.pdf. Robert Bartlett determined that prices quoted on those
secondary markets substantially exceeded issuers’ own valuations used for
pricing stock option grants. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of newly emerging
secondary markets and associated regulatory issues, see generally Elizabeth
Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (2012)
(discussing the potential benefits of, and regulatory challenges associated with,
new secondary markets).
140. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing how market
prices impound information).
141. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 297 (stating that “[i]nvestors cannot
rely on pricing in . . . undeveloped markets to accurately reflect known
information about the risk and return characteristics of the securities
involved”).
142. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 204–07 (discussing cognitive biases
displayed by investors).
143. See Langevoort, supra note 16, at 1042–43 (examining the policy
implications of investors’ bounded rationality and stating that the SEC rejects
“classical economic argument” regarding efficiency of exchange transactions
with respect to “naïve, unsophisticated” investors); c.f. Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206, 1243–44 (2003) (arguing that traditional economic
rationales for enforcing terms of form contracts lose force when buyers are only
boundedly rational and therefore agree to terms that fail to satisfy even their
own preferences).
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The presence of incapable investors may even negatively
affect capable investors by creating incentives for fraud and
misinformation, counter to the goals of capital formation and
investor-choice protection. When there are a large number of
incapable investors in the market, companies may turn their
efforts to hard sales tactics designed to influence unsophisticated
investors, rather than providing the more meaningful
information demanded by sophisticated investors. As Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explain:
[I]t is possible that . . . promoters may find the gains from
deception greater than the reputational loss. This is especially
likely if the public contains a pool of persons who cannot
evaluate information and therefore cannot tell good projects
from bad. Call them suckers. If there are enough suckers,
sellers may make a living dealing exclusively with them,
abandoning all prospects of sales to the informed. It follows
that some firms will find fraud to be the project with the
highest net present value.144

At some level of pervasive misinformation, we might expect
capable investors to simply drop out of the market, as
distinguishing good from bad investments becomes too costly.145 A
sorting mechanism potentially counteracts this harmful dynamic
by limiting the market to capable investors least susceptible to
fraud and removing the “suckers.”146
144. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 281.
145. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 674 (“A world with fraud,
or without adequate truthful information, is a world with too little investment,
and in the wrong things to boot.”).
146. It may seem implausible that sorting mechanisms could have much
effect on fraud because a determined fraudster may simply disregard private
placement regulations and sell to whomever he or she considers a good mark.
Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U.
CINCINNATI L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2000) (discussing why mandatory disclosure may
be ineffective against fraud). But evidence suggests fraud is not a binary choice,
and that “honest cheaters” may engage in what they perceive as minor
transgressions while largely complying with other legal requirements to
maintain their self-image as honest people. Michael D. Guttentag, Stumbling
into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Corporate Fraud, in HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 205, 211 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012)
5–7 (discussing work of Dan Ariely and others). Also, even a determined and
blatant fraudster might comply with private placement exemptions while
committing fraud if he or she believes that a registration exemption would be
relatively easy to prove while a fraud claim would be more difficult for victims to

2288

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2253 (2014)

Sorting mechanisms and scaled disclosure are therefore a
theoretically appealing combination for regulating private
placements. Scaled disclosure is strongly consistent with the goal
of capital formation to the extent that it corrects a failure in the
market for disclosure and therefore draws additional investors
into the market.147 While sorting does eliminate some sources of
financing, there are offsetting benefits to capital formation if
eliminating incapable investors improves the overall quality of
information in the market by reducing incentives for fraud.148
A combination of scaled disclosure and sorting might also be
strongly consistent with at least two varieties of investor
protection. Scaled disclosure is strongly consistent with investorchoice protection if it helps investors satisfy their preferences by
providing capable investors with better information than they
reasonably could obtain through their own efforts.149 While
sorting may at first appear inconsistent with investor-choice
protection by excluding some people from the market, a truly
effective sorting mechanism would exclude only those incapable
of making informed investment choices and it is unclear how
much weight ought to be given to facilitating uninformed
investing, particularly if it has a deleterious effect on the overall
quality of information and drives some capable investors out of
the market.150 Sorting mechanisms are in obvious tension with
populist investor protection (by excluding many investors entirely
from private placements).
Table 2 recaps these theoretical strengths of scaled disclosure
and sorting. In sum, a combination of scaled disclosure and
sorting is strongly consistent with capital formation and two of

prove because of subjective elements such as scienter and materiality.
147. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (explaining how scaled
disclosure might advance capital formation).
148. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (discussing how
effective sorting potentially reduces incentives to defraud).
149. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (discussing how scaled
disclosure could advance investor-choice protection).
150. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (describing how a
market with high levels of fraud could push out sophisticated investors); supra
note 143 (suggesting that traditional economic justifications may be less
compelling when investors appear to be making mistakes that do not reflect
their true preferences).
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2. Investment Caps in a Perfect World
Even if investment caps function well (encouraging
diversification and liquidity), they have an ambiguous
relationship with the goals of securities regulation. In terms of
investor protection, caps are comparable to effective scaled
disclosure and sorting, albeit with slightly different strengths and
weaknesses. In contrast to scaled disclosure and sorting,
investment caps are moderately aligned with the goal of populist
investor protection by allowing everyone at least some access to
private placements. Like scaled disclosure and sorting, an
effective cap strongly advances paternalistic investor protection—
though by mitigating the consequences of failed investments,
rather than preventing failed investments.151 Where investment
caps seem inferior to well-functioning sorting and scaled
disclosure is investor-choice protection. A cap may prevent even
capable investors from fully satisfying their preferences. In other
words, “grandma” may in fact be a savvy financial thrill seeker,
and her large investment in a startup might have been wealth
maximizing.152
For related reasons, investment caps are in some tension
with capital formation, at least relative to well-functioning
sorting and scaled disclosure. Limiting the autonomy of riskpreferring investors may drive up issuers’ transaction costs by
increasing the number of investors required for a given financing;
in some cases, it may prevent a financing from happening
altogether.
There is a silver lining for investment caps and the related
goals of capital formation and investor-choice protection. Like
sorting, portfolio mechanisms might helpfully change the
151. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (contrasting smart-money
approaches and investment caps).
152. There is a tradition of referring to vulnerable or impressionable
investors as grandma. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 115, at 994 (“Grandma, and
her money, are in need of protection”). In truth, this author’s grandmothers
were especially financially savvy.
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equation for fraud. In deciding whether to engage in fraud, a
calculating fraudster presumably balances the cost of identifying
and luring victims against the potential payoffs.153 By requiring a
fraudster to lure more victims for the same aggregate payoff,
compelled diversification may drive some fraudsters to instead
pursue legitimate business projects or scams not involving
securities, thereby advancing capital formation and investorchoice protection by improving the overall quality of information
in the market.154 For this reason, one could describe portfolio
mechanisms as moderately aligned with capital formation and
investor-choice protection.
Table 2 recaps these theoretical strengths and weaknesses of
investment caps and compares caps to smart-money approaches.
In sum, investment caps compare reasonably well on investorprotection grounds (albeit with different strengths and
weaknesses than smart-money approaches), but have a more
ambiguous relationship to capital formation.
B. The Practical Problem of Universality
Despite their superior theoretical appeal, scaled-disclosure
and sorting prove difficult to implement effectively. This Part
describes those difficulties and focuses on one potential cause—
the broad range of investment products governed by private
placement regulations.
1. Universality and the Failure of Scaled Disclosure
Issuers rarely use exemptions that require scaled disclosure.
Regulation A’s disclosure requirements, while less demanding
than a registered public offering, are considered too onerous.155
153. See Cormac Herley, Why Do Nigerian Scammers Say They Are From
Nigeria?, MICROSOFT RESEARCH, http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/
default.aspx?id=167719 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (discussing the “per-target”
effort of financial scammers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
154. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (describing how sorting
may reduce fraud and improve information).
155. See Campbell, supra note 104, at 82–83 (proposing reforms to
Regulation A).
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Similarly, issuers customarily limit Rule 506 offerings to
accredited investors in order to avoid the disclosure requirements
triggered by sales to non-accredited investors.156
The infrequent use of scaled-disclosure mechanisms suggests
the approach has failed in its goal of overcoming market failures.
Investors do not seem to value information that the SEC requires
for these exemptions. Put another way, the required disclosure is
not what investors would bargain for in the absence of market
failure.
The failure of scaled disclosure pushes activity to exemptions
that rely heavily on sorting mechanisms,157 but commentators
express doubt that those exemptions effectively protect investors.
In particular, increasing reliance on the accredited-investor
standard is puzzling. In addition to the criticism that the income
and net worth standards are in need of adjustment—they are
largely unchanged since the early 1980s—there is a more
fundamental question as to whether those standards are
meaningful proxies for investment capability.158
If scaled-disclosure and sorting mechanisms are flawed in
practice, there are a number of possible explanations. Scholars
variously charge that Congress and regulators are susceptible to
interest-group pressure, lack proper incentives, suffer from
cognitive limitations, or too easily fall prey to the wrong
ideology.159 This Article focuses on a different regulatory
156. See Johnson, supra note 115, at 1002 n.56 (citing a study indicating
that over 90% of Regulation D offerings are limited to accredited investors).
157. See id. (discussing the popularity of Regulation D offerings that are
limited to accredited investors).
158. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 291, 299 (suggesting that the
accredited-investor standard leaves wealthy but unsophisticated investors
vulnerable); Jennifer Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Blackhole, 35
DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 191–92 nn.242–43 (2010) (arguing that “there is also a
growing recognition that the accredited-investor standard provides insufficient
protection for investors”); Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The
Elusive Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings
of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 22 (1998) (questioning the
relationship between wealth standards and financial sophistication); Greg
Oguss, Note, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal Securities
Laws?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 288–90, 301–09 (2012) (cataloguing criticisms of
the accredited-investor definition and providing recent case studies of fraud
allegations by institutional investors).
159. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54, at 671 (discussing interestgroup pressure and securities law); M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay
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challenge: the broad range of investment products Congress and
the SEC are trying to regulate.
For the most part, exemptions are not tied to specific kinds of
issuers. Investment in an oil and gas partnership is subject to the
same rules as investment in a high-tech startup, a private
offering of public-company stock (a PIPE transaction), or a worm
farm.160 In describing the wide range of financial arrangements
subject to regulation as securities, a leading treatise states: “The
catalogue of these schemes is as variegated as the imaginations of
promoters.”161
This attempt to address a wide variety of investment types
through one set of rules—what I call “universality”—complicates
development of scaled-disclosure requirements. Simply put,
different types of information are relevant to different investment
products.
Consider two investments typically offered to individuals
through private placement offerings: oil and gas partnerships and
angel investments in high-tech startup companies.162 Oil and gas
partnerships are formed by promoters who identify, develop, and
manage drilling projects.163 The promoters fund their projects by
soliciting investment from wealthy individuals who will be
passive investors.164 Angel investors are individuals who invest in
for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1031–40 (2012) (discussing
incentives of regulators); Choi, supra note 75, at 317–19 (discussing cognitive
biases of regulators); Friedman, supra note 14, at 291–93 (discussing the
influence of ideology on regulators).
160. See Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that an
interest in a worm farm constituted a security); Oguss, supra note 158, at 310–
11 (noting the “tremendous range of contemporary investment products” and the
associated difficulty of devising any single “financial literacy exam”); supra note
29 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of a security under federal
law).
161. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 246–64 (5th ed. 2004).
162. The angel investment market is estimated at $25 billion annually.
Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 1419 n.57. The market for private placement oil and
gas partnerships is approximately $700 million annually. See KATHY HESHELOW,
INVESTING IN OIL & GAS: THE ABCS OF DPPS (2d ed. 2010) (providing an estimate
for “private placement drilling programs” in 2005).
163. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 98–108 (explaining how oil and gas
partnerships are established).
164. Id. at 8–11. See JOHN ORBAN, III, MONEY IN THE GROUND: INSIDER’S
GUIDE TO OIL & GAS DEALS 177–96 (4th ed. 2006) (explaining how funding is
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high-growth startups, typically after a company’s founders have
exhausted personal resources but before these companies are
established enough to obtain venture capital.165
At some level of generalization, the same types of
information may be relevant to both investments. In both cases,
investors will presumably seek information about the promoters’
(or founders’) prior track record and expertise, the anticipated
costs of the project, and projected returns.166 But at the level of
specificity that informs actual investment decisions, relevant
information will be quite different. For example, the projected
cost of an oil and gas drilling project is driven largely by
geological and technical factors, such as anticipated well depth
and drilling conditions, which are inapposite to an investment in
a technology startup. 167 Conversely, projected returns for a high
growth startup are driven by the size of the potential market for
a new product and the ability to capture a large share of that
market through intellectual property rights and besting potential
competitors, none of which is obviously relevant to a drilling
operation.168
Note that the type of historical information required by most
scaled-disclosure mechanisms, such as financial statements, is
not particularly important to evaluating either investment
opportunity.169 That is not to say, however, that historical
financial information is never important to investors. A key
employee who is offered the opportunity to invest in his or her
privately owned employer, for example, would likely value
information about past and current profitability and the extent of
obtained for oil and gas projects).
165. See Cable, supra note 4, at 108–17 (providing an overview of angel
investing); Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 1416–25 (describing angel investing).
166. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 98–108 (identifying information
relevant to selecting an oil and gas partnership investment); MAYNARD &
WARREN, supra note 115, at 9–10, 235, 461 (describing topics expected to be
covered in a startup company business plan seeking outside investment).
167. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 100–02 (listing factors that are
considered in projecting the costs of a drilling project).
168. See MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 115, at 9–10, 235, 461 (explaining
factors that are considered in projecting the return on investment in a startup
company).
169. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing informational
requirements of Regulation A and Rule 506 of Regulation D).
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past distributions to equity holders. The point is that crafting
universally relevant disclosure standards at the level of
specificity necessary to substantially aid investors is daunting.
One might object that this argument proves too much—the
baseline rule of mandatory disclosure for public offerings also
applies across a wide range of investment products. Public
equities markets include issuers in distinct industries offering
securities with distinct features, and the system seems to
function well enough. Why doesn’t the problem of universality
similarly plague public offerings? In fact, some mandatory
disclosure requirements imposed by the SEC are industry
specific.170 More generally, the accounting profession often
develops standards tailored to particular industries, which shape
the audited financial statements required in connection with
public offerings.171 In other words, the SEC mostly delegates the
task of developing industry-specific disclosure to the accounting
profession. This same approach has not proven effective in the
private placement context, presumably because historical
financial information is often less important to the types of
businesses that rely on private placements and because obtaining
audited financials represents a fixed cost that may be
disproportionate to smaller private placements.172
2. Universality and the Failure of Sorting
Universality is not just a problem for scaled disclosure. It
also poses a challenge for sorting mechanisms.173 Policymakers
170. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.1100 (2014) (imposing special disclosure
requirements with respect to securitization assets in Regulation AB); id. § 210.9.
(imposing special disclosure requirements on bank holding companies in Article
9 of Regulation S-X); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2012) (subjecting mutual funds
to a separate statutory scheme through the Investment Company Act of 1940);
Guttentag, supra note 50, at 178–79 (discussing industry-specific disclosure
requirements imposed on publicly traded companies in the oil and gas sector).
171. See generally ERNST & YOUNG, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION
985–605, SOFTWARE–REVENUE RECOGNITION (2014) (describing accounting
principles for recognizing revenue from software licensing agreements).
172. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text (explaining that the cost
of disclosures may not be proportionate to the size of a firm or offering).
173. See Oguss, supra note 158, at 310–11 (“[F]inancial literacy can mean
very different things in different contexts . . . . Accordingly, it is hard to imagine
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sometimes equate investor sophistication with general financial
literacy.174 But this focus misses an important component of
investor capability—familiarity with conventions that vary
significantly across different investment products.
In a previous article, for example, I described the
conventional set of contract terms and practices angel investors
use to mitigate the extreme information asymmetry, uncertainty,
and agency costs associated with startups.175 Among those
conventional contractual terms are receipt of corporate preferred
stock176 and—less frequently—representation on a corporate
board of directors.177
Investors in oil and gas projects also face significant
information asymmetry, uncertainly, and agency costs, yet
conventional investment terms in this context are quite different
from an angel investment. For one, drilling projects are typically
organized as “pass-through” entities—limited liability companies
or limited partnerships—rather than the corporate form used for
angel investments in startups.178 In addition, oil and gas
investors and promoters receive distributions of cash as soon as
the project begins generating profits, while angel investors and
any one exam of a reasonable length that could accurately measure an investor’s
or a purchaser representative’s relevant knowledge in all such contexts.”).
174. See Willis, supra note 71, at 199–203 (discussing increased efforts to
promote financial literacy).
175. See Cable, supra note 4, at 124–31 (describing how venture capital and
angel investors use preferred stock, board representation, negative covenants,
and other mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry).
176. Preferred stock gives investors (a) financial preferences over the
founders in the case of a company failure and (b) conversion into common stock
in the event of an IPO or trade sale. The financial preference might serve a
useful signaling function because only a founder who is confident in their
abilities would agree to it. See id. at 124–25 (“By agreeing to the liquidation
preference for the V[enture] C[apital] fund, but accepting common stock for
themselves, entrepreneurs may be signaling their confidence . . . .”). The
conversion of preferred stock into common at an IPO may reflect a bargain to
return control to the founders once the period of greatest uncertainly has
passed. See id. at 124–27 (discussing the work of Ronald Gilson, George
Triantis, and others).
177. Board representation allows angel investors to monitor the progress of
the founders in achieving their business plans. See id. at 125.
178. This significantly affects the accounting and tax treatment of the
project’s operations. HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 8–9; ORBAN, supra note 164,
at 161–75.
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startup company founders typically receive a return on their
investment only when the company is sold or achieves an initial
public offering.179
A number of contextual differences account for these
contrasting investment conventions. The choice of entity is likely
explained by tax law, which is especially favorable to oil and gas
exploration.180 The timing of cash distributions reflects
fundamental differences in the nature of the underlying business
ventures. An oil and gas drilling project is a depleting asset that
generates cash flows relatively quickly with limited additional
capital after an initial investment in equipment and evaluation of
the prospect.181 A high-growth startup, in contrast, ordinarily
requires ongoing capital investment (including reinvestment of
any early profits) to develop the kinds of products, and achieve
the scale, necessary for an initial public offering or profitable
acquisition.182
For the purposes of this Article, the critical point is only that
investing conventions vary significantly across investment
products. We cannot assume that a savvy angel investor is also a
savvy investor in oil and gas partnerships. Investment
experience, and therefore sophistication, is context specific.

179. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 97–101 (suggesting that oil and gas
partnerships begin distributing cash as early as six months after investment
and can completely “pay out” in two to three years).
180. Pass-through entities are generally superior to corporations for tax
purposes because they avoid double taxation. Angel investors, however, may
agree to a corporate form because subsequent venture-capital investors prefer
them (for their own somewhat esoteric tax reasons) and because the benefits of
pass-through treatment may be diminished by the alternative minimum tax. See
MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note 115, at 112–28 (detailing the tax advantages of
various business entities). Oil and gas partnerships receive beneficial tax
treatment that avoids the alternative minimum tax problem. HESHELOW, supra
note 162, at 89–93.
181. See HESHELOW, supra note 162, at 118 (explaining the financing and
revenue structure of a drilling project).
182. See Cable, supra note 44, at 229 (explaining the importance of
scalability to venture-capital investors).
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3. The Result: Counterproductive Smart-Money Approaches
The historical failures of scaled disclosure and sorting have
important implications. Specifically, the comparison of theoretical
strengths described in Part IV.A and Table 2 is not the most
helpful exercise for guiding policy. Instead, it is necessary to
evaluate smart-money approaches in their inevitably flawed
states. Viewed this way, scaled disclosure and sorting are not
only less effective than they originally appear; they are
potentially counter-productive.
Capital formation is hindered by scaled disclosure that
compels information investors do not value. Such compelled
disclosure becomes an additional transaction cost rather than a
solution to a market failure.183 At the margins, this additional
transaction cost may drive some potential investors in a private
offering to other investment opportunities.
Capital formation may also suffer from ineffective sorting
mechanisms. Recall that effective sorting mechanisms—those
that accurately distinguish between capable and incapable
investors—might help quality issuers by eliminating noise from
the market and reducing incentives for misinformation.184 In
contrast, sorting mechanisms based on wealth standards alone
may do the opposite by identifying and leaving unprotected ideal
candidates for fraud—wealthy but unsophisticated investors.185
The dynamic is similar to that observed in a paper popularized by
Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner in their recent book Think
Like a Freak.186 Dubner and Levitt describe the work of a
Microsoft researcher asserting that e-mail scammers identify
themselves as being from Nigeria (a well-known origin for such
scams) to reduce their costs of identifying and luring viable
183. See Guttentag, supra note 50, at 163–64 (describing the cost of
“regulatory waste”).
184. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (describing how sorting
may reduce fraud and improve information).
185. Studies suggest that targets of securities fraud have relatively high
incomes compared to the general population and victims of other types of fraud,
supporting the intuition that a fraudster will prefer deep pockets to maximize
payoffs. KARLA PAK & DOUG SHADEL, AARP FOUNDATION NATIONAL FRAUD VICTIM
STUDY 4 (2011).
186. See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, THINK LIKE A FREAK 154–
61 (2014) (describing research by Cormac Herley).
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victims.187 By responding to an e-mail originating from Nigeria,
the potential victim self-identifies as gullible or uninformed about
email scams.188 Analogously, the accredited-investor concept may
help perpetrators of securities fraud efficiently target deeppocketed victims by legitimizing inquiries into wealth. In some
cases, the current regulatory scheme even encourages wealthy
investors to helpfully serve themselves up on a silver platter by
organizing into standing databases of accredited investors.189
Investor protections are also predictably weakened when
scaled disclosure produces the wrong information and sorting
fails to identify incapable investors. Investors are not aided in
satisfying their preferences—in fact, some preferred investments
are made too expensive by arbitrary disclosure requirements and
some perfectly capable, but not wealthy, investors are excluded
from the market altogether. Such a regime also does little to stop
incapable investors from making mistakes and perhaps
emboldens some wealthy but unsophisticated investors by
deeming them accredited.
Table 3 summarizes the weak performance of ineffective
smart-money approaches across all goals of securities law.
C. The Case for Investment Caps (Mad Money)
Of course, the fact that scaled disclosure and sorting are
difficult to implement does not by itself mean those mechanisms
are inferior to investment caps and other portfolio mechanisms.
187. See id. at 157–59 (describing the costs of luring victims and of “falsepositives”); Herley, supra note 153 (discussing the costs to a scammer of
identifying victims).
188. See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 186, at 159–61 (discussing how
scammers cause gullible victims to reveal themselves).
189. For example, a company named American Direct Marketing Services,
Inc. offers access to such a database. ADMS’ Accredited Investors, ADMS,
http://www.dmlist.com/direct-mail-telemarketing-lists/adms’-accreditedinvestors#sthash.6nxWh6Di.dpuf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In promoting sale of the list, the site
explains: “$1,000,000 minimum net worth separates the Accredited Investor
from the other 96.4% of America’s investing public. ADMS’ Accredited Investor
database will position the financial services marketer in a specifically attractive
universe of high net worth investors and major market players capable of
making five and six figure investments.” Id.
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To make the case for portfolio mechanisms, one has to show that
they are less affected by universality than smart-money
approaches. To that end, this Part V.C considers how investment
caps perform when taking into account implementation
challenges posed by universality.
With respect to the goals of capital formation, investor-choice
protection, and populist protection, it is hard to see how the broad
scope of private placement regulation has much effect. For
example, recall that even a perfectly effective investment cap (one
that ensures diversification and liquidity) has mixed effects on
the goal of capital formation and the highly correlated goal of
investor-choice protection. By its nature, a cap reduces some riskpreferring investors’ range of choice and potentially drives up an
issuer’s cost of capital.190 On the other hand, an investment cap
also drives up the cost of fraud and may improve the overall
quality of information.191 Universality does not appear to change
these results. Even a cap that totally fails in its objectives of
diversification and liquidity still potentially increases the costs of
both legitimate and illegitimate capital raising. These steady
results stand in contrast to the current accredited-investor
definition, which in theory reduces incentives to defraud but, in
fact, may create a perfect storm of wealthy and unsophisticated
investors without substantial protections.192
That is not to say that universality has no effect on
investment caps. As described above, the strength of an effective
investment cap is its strong paternalistic protection of investors
through diversification and liquidity.193 Universality is likely a
significant, but not insurmountable, challenge for achieving
meaningful diversification.
Because of universality, a simple investment cap encourages
only modest diversification and does not ensure the greater
benefits achievable through a sophisticated asset allocation
strategy. Finance professors and securities professionals suggest
that an optimal investment portfolio would not only include
190. Supra note 152 and accompanying text.
191. Supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 185, 189 and accompanying text (discussing how
current regulations affect incentives to defraud).
193. Supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
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investments in several different companies, but also investments
in different industries, asset classes (stocks, bonds, and cash),
and geographic markets (U.S. and non-U.S.).194 In other words,
an investor whose entire asset portfolio consists of stock in fifty
social media startups headquartered in Palo Alto is not as well
diversified as an investor who spreads fifty investments over
companies of varying sizes, industries, and geographic location.
The goal of a sophisticated asset allocation strategy is to hold a
large number of investments with low “covariance,” meaning the
investments do not have parallel returns.195
The importance of covariance is often illustrated through the
type of highly stylized example that follows.196 Assume that an
investor plans to purchase $100,000 of Security A sold in a
private placement. Assume that on average Security A has a
positive expected return but that it is risky (volatile) in the sense
of having potential for either big losses or big gains.197 Now
suppose the investor has the opportunity to instead invest half of
the $100,000 in a new security. If the value of the new security is
perfectly positively correlated with Security A, so that the new
security increases and decreases in value in parallel to Security
A, the investor will not decrease risk through diversification.198 In
contrast, the investor can eliminate risk altogether if the new
security is perfectly negatively correlated with Security A, so that
the new security always declines in value when Security A
194. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 206–14 (discussing the benefits of
diversification); DAVID F. SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL
APPROACH TO INVESTING 16–17, 22 (same); THE VANGUARD GROUP, INC.,
VANGUARD’S
PRINCIPLES
FOR
INVESTING
SUCCESS,
12–16
(2014)
http://www.vanguard.com/pdf/s700.pdf (discussing the benefits of diversification
across asset classes).
195. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 204 (describing the concept of
covariance); SWENSON, supra note 194, at 16–17 (explaining the importance of
diversification).
196. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 202–06 (explaining modern portfolio
theory through the example of an island economy with two potential
investments); Risk and Return: Diversification, COLUMBIA BUS. SCH. PREMBA
FIN., https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/premba/finance/s6/s6_5.cfm (last visited
Nov. 19, 2014) (providing an example of a two-stock portfolio) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
197. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 196–202 (identifying volatility as a
measure of financial risk).
198. Id. at 202–06.
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increases in value and the new security always increases in value
when Security A decreases in value.199 It is hard to imagine such
perfect positive correlation or perfect negative correlation, and
real-life examples fall somewhere in between.200 The important
point is that diversification will provide some risk reduction at
anything less than perfect positive correlation, but a more
effective diversification strategy requires judgments about the
degree of correlation between investments.201 This discussion of
covariance is good and bad news for investment caps. The bad
news is that optimal diversification would require regulators to
categorize every potential investment and to understand its
relationship to every other asset held by the investor. The broad
range of investment types that private placement regulations
encompass likely renders this task impossible. But the good news
is that imperfect diversification still makes a difference.202
Ensuring that no single investment in a private placement
dominates an investor’s portfolio is a sound, if modest, objective.
Furthermore, an investment cap’s other objective of liquidity
seems mostly unfazed by universality. It is reasonable to presume
that any private placement is going to be relatively hard to
convert into cash. This is a valid presumption across all types of
private placements because illiquidity is a regulatory
consequence of private placement status, rather than an intrinsic
quality that differs across investment products. Under applicable
law, securities initially sold in private placements cannot be

199. As an example of negatively correlated investments, a leading corporate
finance text discusses a hypothetical beach resort that thrives on sunny days
and raincoat factory that thrives when it rains. Id. at 203.
200. Id. at 205.
201. Id. at 206 (“Now comes the real kicker; negative correlation is not
necessary to achieve the reduction of benefits from diversification.”). The
marginal effect on volatility decreases with each security added. See id. at 207.
Some suggest that the bulk of diversification’s benefits are achieved with a
portfolio of approximately fifty stocks, assuming the portfolio is limited to U.S.
equities. See id. (summarizing various studies). Others suggest that a larger
number of stocks is necessary for optimal diversification. See WILLIAM K.S.
WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 3.3.6 n.81 (2d ed. 2008) (reviewing
evidence that most investors are not diversified).
202. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 576 (“[A]nything less than perfect
positive correlation can potentially reduce risk.”).
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resold freely on securities markets.203 They are therefore illiquid
by law.
Of course, liquidity is a relative concept and it is conceptually
possible that a particular private placement investment would
improve liquidity of a particular investor’s portfolio because the
investor’s beginning position is extremely illiquid. But data on
household wealth suggests that this scenario is unlikely. The
major categories of assets that most American families report
owning—real
estate204
and
retirement
accounts205—fall
somewhere in the middle of the liquidity spectrum. One can often
sell or borrow real estate, though with delay and expense; one can
also borrow against or withdraw from many types of retirement
plans, though usually with tax penalties.206 While reducing these
commonly held assets to cash is not effortless, it is hard to see
how adding private placements to the mix likely improves
liquidity.
In sum, this analysis confirms the intuition that containing
risk through investment caps has practical advantages over
trying to engineer each transaction to be safe. Like securities
professionals who categorize private placements as “alternative”
or “non-core” assets that should represent only a limited portion
(0% to 25%) of an investor’s portfolio,207 investment caps
203. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (describing restrictions
on re-sale).
204. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (describing census data
regarding household wealth).
205. The Federal Reserve collects data on financial asset ownership. U.S.
Fed. Reserve Bd., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Fins., 98 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 24–31 (June
2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf. With 50%
of households reporting ownership of a retirement account, such accounts are
the second most commonly held financial asset, with only transaction accounts
(i.e., bank accounts) ranking higher. Id. Retirement accounts average 38% of
household wealth. Id.
206. See Janet Novack, 11 Ways To Tap Retirement Cash Early, Without a
10% Penalty, (Jan. 15, 2013, 3:56 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/
2013/01/15/11-ways-to-tap-retirement-cash-early-without-a-10-penalty/
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2014) (recommending strategies to withdraw retirement funds
without tax penalties) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
207. See SWENSEN, supra note 194, at 92–93 (discussing non-core asset
classes, such as investments in venture-capital funds); HESHELOW, supra note
162, at 92–93 (describing oil and gas partnerships as alternative asset classes);
U.S. TRUST, ASSET ALLOCATION AND ANGEL INVESTING (Feb. 24, 2005) (describing
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recognize that risk ultimately depends not only on the
characteristics of a particular security but also its place in a
broader investment portfolio. By setting some basic parameters
for investors’ portfolio construction, Congress and the SEC can
provide modest yet meaningful risk mitigation without perfect
knowledge.
V. A Proposal
The first four Parts of this Article made the case for
investment caps. Though effective smart-money approaches have
theoretical advantages over investment caps, sorting and scaled
disclosure are difficult to implement over the broad range of
investment products to which private placement regulations
apply. This problem of universality suggests that investment caps
should constitute the core of private placement regulations. This
Part outlines a specific proposal for implementing investment
caps, and then addresses potential objections.
A. The Scope
The investment-cap proposal outlined below would replace
safe-harbor exemptions in current Regulation D, including but
not limited to Rule 506. As a safe-harbor exemption, the proposal
would not be the exclusive means to avoid registration obligations
under the ’33 Act. An issuer could complete a transaction in
excess of the investment cap and still take the position that the
sale complied with Section 4(a)(2) of the ’33 Act and related case
law because of the purchaser’s clear ability to fend for itself. In
this vein, publicly traded companies frequently issue debt to
institutional investors in private placements.208 Under current
angel investments as alternative investments and suggesting that alternative
assets represent 0–25% of an investor’s portfolio, private equity represent 20–
60% of alternative investments, angel investments represent no more than 50%
of private equity, and the amount allocated to angel investing should be divided
among 5 to 10 individual investments) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
208. See Guttentag, supra note 50, at 151 n.125 (explaining the private debt
market and the disclosure demands of participating investors).
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law, issuers do sometimes rely on the Rule 506 safe harbor for
these transactions, but in other instances issuers take the
position that these transactions comply with Section 4(a)(2)
without expressly relying on the safe harbor.209 Similarly, the
proposal does not preclude reliance on Section 4(a)(2) when there
is no significant question about the ability of purchasers to fend
for themselves, such as sales of stock to venture-capital funds and
corporate-debt offerings to institutional buyers. The proposal will
have its greatest effect on modestly sized offerings to individuals,
where the Regulation D safe harbors have their greatest value
because sophistication of the purchasers is less certain and
litigation risk is higher.210
Moreover, the proposal does not preclude use of scaled
disclosure and sorting in future safe harbors. Those mechanisms
may have a role in exemptions that are limited to specific
investment contexts or products. For example, I previously
proposed an exemption specifically tailored to angel investments
in startup companies.211 The exemption would have employed
209. These offerings are often referred to as “144A offerings.” See LLOYD S.
HARMETZ, MORRISON FOERSTER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT RULE
144A, at 1 (2009), http://media.mofo.com/docs/pdf/faqrule144a.pdf. (providing a
general overview of Rule 144A). Rule 144A exempts resales of securities to
“qualified institutional buyers” who meet financial standards far more
demanding than accredited investor status. See id. (describing qualifications for
investment in Rule 144A offerings). Because 144A is an exemption for resales
(but is not available to issuers for initial sales), a 144A offering first relies on
either § 4(a)(2) or Rule 506 for an initial sale (often to a financial intermediary)
and then Rule 144A for subsequent resales. See id. (“Any person other than an
issuer may rely on Rule 144A. Issuers must find another exemption for the offer
and sale of unregistered securities. Typically they rely on Section 4(2) (often in
reliance on Regulation D) or Regulation S under the Securities Act.”); SCOTT
BAUGUESS & VLADIMIR I. IVANOV, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION 2 (2012)
(suggesting that the first leg of a 144A exemption typically relies on Section
4(a)(2)).
210. See BAUGUESS & IVANOV, supra note 209, at 3, 11–12 (reporting, based
on an empirical study of Form D filings, that Regulation D is most frequently
used for offerings of below $2 million by non-financial issuers, though large
offerings by financial issuers do account for a large percentage of the total dollar
value of Regulation D offerings).
211. The proposed exemption would have been available only to privately
held operating companies—not publicly traded companies conducting PIPE
offerings, real estate partnerships, hedge funds, or similar investment vehicles.
See Cable, supra note 4, at 168–72 (explaining the scope of the proposed reform).
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sorting mechanisms based on a profile of angel investors with
demonstrated success in mitigating the challenges of investing in
startup companies.212 Policy makers should continue to consider
such context-specific exemptions where possible—this Article
recognizes that effective smart-money approaches may have
advantages over investment caps. It would be impractical,
however, to rely on a collection of context-specific exemptions as
the only safe harbors from registration. Investment products
come, go, and evolve, and we cannot wait for Congress or the SEC
to address each investment product separately.
B. The Details
While this Article’s analysis points in the general direction of
investment caps, the devil will always be in the details. In that
spirit, this subpart outlines a more specific proposal. The
proposed cap would subject an investment to two separate tests:
one to encourage diversification and one to encourage liquidity.
1. A Diversification Test
An investor would be considered diversified if he or she
limited a particular private placement investment to a specific
percentage (2.5%, for example) of the investor’s gross assets.
Use of gross, as opposed to net, assets is a departure from
current investment caps.213 The proposal takes this approach
because high levels of debt, while posing some potential risk to
212. The proposal would have eliminated the ban on general solicitation and
relieved intermediaries (such as “finders”) from broker–dealer or investment
adviser regulation so long as all investors met both the current accredited
investor standard and at least one additional qualification. Id. The additional
qualifications included experience as an investor or experience as an
entrepreneur, reflecting the important role that entrepreneurial (as opposed to
financial) experience appears to play in selecting angel investments. Id.
Entrepreneurial experience would have been demonstrated by participation in a
Rule 506 offering as an executive officer of the issuer, while financial experience
would have been demonstrated by ownership or management of at least $1.5
million in investments (roughly corresponding to the average angel investor
portfolio). Id.
213. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text (describing investment
caps under current law).
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investors, are not necessarily relevant to whether an investor is
appropriately diversified.214
This diversification test also departs from the JOBS Act cap
by applying only to the amount purchased from a particular
issuer, rather than imposing an aggregate cap for all private
placements.215 For diversification purposes, the primary focus is
dividing purchases among different issuers; any limit on
aggregate exposure to private placements is better addressed
under the liquidity test below.
One can imagine a more sophisticated diversification
measure that would take into account covariance.216 Such a
measure would require categorizing not only the new investment,
but also the existing assets of the purchaser that serve as the
“denominator” for purposes of the specified percentage. For
instance, census data on household wealth indicates that
ownership of personal residences and investment real estate
represent a significant portion of most Americans’ asset
portfolios.217 The proposed exemption could disqualify such real
estate holdings as denominator assets for purposes of real-estatebased private placements (such as limited partnerships for
developing and operating real estate projects) to encourage
diversification across asset classes. Ultimately, however, it seems
214. For example, Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff suggest that young
investors borrow to enlarge their stock portfolios, partly on diversification
grounds. See IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE,
AND AUDACIOUS WAY TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR RETIREMENT
PORTFOLIO 15–18 (2010) (proposing that young investors use leverage to
diversify investment across time).
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8) (2012) (applying the crowdfunding
investment cap on an aggregate annual basis); supra note 10 (discussing the
aggregate investment cap).
216. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (describing the concept of
covariance and its importance to diversification).
217. See ALFRED O. GOTTSCHALCK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NET WORTH AND THE
ASSETS OF HOUSEHOLDS: 2002, at 1 (2008), http://www.census.gov/prod/2008
pubs/p70-115.pdf (“[A]s home ownership rates climb, more and more households
can claim their homes as a source of wealth and, in the majority of cases, as
their predominant asset.”). According to 2002 census data, 67.7% of households
include equity in their own home among their reported asset holdings. Id. at 5
tbl.1. The median value of such equity is $73,697. Id. A much smaller
percentage of households report owning rental property (4.5%) and other real
estate (6.6%), though the median reported value of these asset types is relatively
high ($100,000 and $45,000, respectively). Id.

MAD MONEY

2307

likely the benefits of such refinements to the diversification test
are outweighed by the associated administrative challenges.
Issuers, investors, and regulators are not accustomed to
classifying assets in this manner and in some cases there may not
be adequate information for making reasonable assumptions
about covariance. In contrast, participants in private placements
are accustomed to determining asset value more generally as part
of verifying accredited-investor status.218 In order to avoid selfdefeating administrative complexity, the proposal uses a simple
diversification measure based on the purchaser’s total assets,
regardless of the nature of those assets.
2. A Liquidity Test
An investor could demonstrate ability to bear illiquidity
either through asset holdings or annual income. For the asset
test, net (as opposed to gross) wealth is a sensible measure. To
the extent that assets are encumbered by debt, those assets are
less likely to be available for satisfying current obligations. In
addition to net assets, high annual income suggests the capacity
to hold illiquid private placements. Therefore, like the investment
cap in the new crowdfunding exemption, the liquidity test would
require that an investment not exceed the higher of: (1) a
specified percentage of net assets, or (2) a specified percentage of
annual income.219 In the absence of compelling reasons to pick a
different number, the specified percentage could be 10%, similar
to the current crowdfunding exemption.220
As with the diversification measure, one could imagine more
or less elaborate liquidity tests. It seems advisable to exclude
other private placements as denominator assets for a net assets
test, due to the inherent illiquidity of private placements. In
theory, regulators could go further and classify all assets by
relative liquidity and weigh them accordingly. For example,
218. See infra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing SEC guidance on
verifying accredited-investor status).
219. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text (discussing the assets
and income in the crowdfunding exemption).
220. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text (discussing the
percentage thresholds in the crowdfunding exemption).
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primary residences and retirement accounts with tax penalties
for withdrawals could be disqualified or discounted as
denominator assets based on their relative illiquidity.221 As with
more elaborate diversification measures, the additional
administrative complexities of these more elaborate liquidity
measures likely outweigh the benefits. Accordingly, the proposal
uses a liquidity test that could be satisfied based on income or net
assets, with only private placements excluded as denominator
assets.
C. Competing Proposals
Since the JOBS Act was enacted, others have suggested a
modest additional role for investment caps. These competing
proposals graft investment caps onto the existing regulatory
framework by incorporating them into the current accreditedinvestor definition.222 The result is that an issuer would gain
significant regulatory freedom under Rule 506 if: (1) all
purchasers meet threshold income and net worth standards
similar to those currently employed in the accredited-investor
definition and (2) purchasers also comply with an investment cap
221. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing relative liquidity
of commonly held assets).
222. See Larissa Lee, Note, The Ban Has Lifted: Now Is the Time to Change
the Accredited-Investor Standard, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 369, 386–88 (2014)
(proposing modification of the accredited-investor definition to include adjusted
wealth standards, an investment cap based on net assets or income, and
subjective sophistication assessment); Oguss, supra note 158, at 310–18
(proposing modification of the accredited-investor definition to adjust wealth
standards for inflation and impose an investment cap of 25% of net assets, with
a phase-out of the investment cap at some multiple of the wealth standards).
Most recently, the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee recommended changes to
the accredited-investor definition. The committee made a variety of
recommendations, including financial literacy testing, facilitation of third-party
investor-status verification, and investment caps. For illustrative purposes, the
committee outlined an approach that would retain existing wealth standards as
a minimum threshold for accredited-investor status, with an additional
investment cap based on net assets or income that would phase out at some
higher wealth standard. Recommendations of the Investor as Purchaser
Subcommittee and the Investor Education Subcommittee: Accredited Investor
Definition, INVESTOR ADVISORY COMM., http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investoradvisory-committee-2012.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter
Advisory Committee Recommendations].

MAD MONEY

2309

limiting their individual investments to a percentage of their net
assets or income. By limiting reforms to the accredited-investor
definition, current avenues for sales to non-accredited investors
would remain intact.223 This Article departs from these competing
proposals in several respects.
First, because this Article’s proposal completely replaces
Regulation D with investment caps, it eliminates current
exemptions under Regulation D that allow sales to non-accredited
investors in small offerings or after scaled disclosure. As
discussed in Part IV.B.1 above, scaled disclosure is unlikely to
provide investors with helpful information across a wide range of
investment products, so this Article removes scaled disclosure
from the core safe-harbor exemption and reserves that
mechanism for context-specific exemptions where more
meaningful disclosure standards might be possible.224 This Article
also recommends eliminating the exemption in Rule 504 for small
offerings ($1 million or less) on the logic that a small offering size
can still cause significant losses if concentrated in a small
number of investors.225
Second, because this Article’s proposal completely replaces
the concept of an accredited investor with the investment cap, it
eliminates wealth thresholds of the type currently used in the
accredited-investor definition. If wealth thresholds are a poor
measure of financial sophistication or the ability to bear risk, as
the bulk of commentary suggests,226 it is unclear what work they
are doing in the regulatory scheme besides arbitrarily limiting
the pool of eligible investors. If wealth thresholds are supposed to
223. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014) (setting forth Rule 504 of
Regulation D, which allows sales to non-accredited investors if the total offering
amount does not exceed $1 million); id. § 230.505 (setting forth Rule 505 of
Regulation D, which allows offerings up to $5 million to non-accredited investors
after provision of audited financials and specified information); id. § 230.506
(setting forth Rule 506 of Regulation D, which allows sales to up to 35
sophisticated, but non-accredited, investors after provision of audited financial
statements and other specified disclosure).
224. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing failures of scaled disclosure); supra
notes 211–12 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of contextspecific exemptions based on scaled disclosure and sorting).
225. See supra note 223 (describing Rule 504).
226. See supra note 158 (citing sources that are critical of the current
accredited-investor definition).
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be a proxy for access to professional advice, then they are not
well-suited to the objective, as discussed further below.227 This
Article takes the position that small investors should be
permitted to risk a small amount of their small wealth, consistent
with the goal of populist investor protection.
Third, this Article’s proposal employs a two-part test
specifically tailored to the dual goals of diversification and
liquidity. As discussed above, gross rather than net assets are the
logical denominator for achieving diversification.228 In addressing
liquidity concerns, net assets or income are the appropriate
measure, but private placements should not be counted as
denominator assets.229 Without adding much administrative
complexity, investment caps can be better suited to the relevant
objectives than they have been in the past.
To an extent, the modest approach of competing proposals
might be chalked up to understandable pragmatic considerations.
In the case of recent work by an SEC advisory committee, the
scope of the recommendations was largely set by statutory
mandate.230 Incremental and more easily won proposals also play
an important role in legal scholarship.231
But, it is also important to avoid past mistakes in simply
piling on additional regulatory mechanisms without scrutinizing
their fit for the job. There is a cost to regulatory clutter—poorly
constructed exemptions can become counterproductive and
obscure analytical clarity. A systematic analysis of the goals of
private placement regulation and current mechanisms suggests a
significant change in direction, with investment caps at the core
of the regulatory scheme and current smart-money approaches at
the periphery. More incremental reforms risk obscuring this
broader insight.
227. See infra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing access to
investment advice).
228. Supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
229. Supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.
230. See Advisory Committee Recommendations, supra note 222, at 2
(referencing the SEC’s statutory mandate to review the accredited-investor
definition).
231. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 55 (1992) (criticizing
legal scholarship for making too many impractical reform proposals).
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D. Potential Objections

Any significant reforms will have drawbacks and detractors.
This subpart anticipates and responds to potential objections.
1. Diversification to Lower Quality
An individual investor may have access to relatively few
quality private placements, and the investment cap may push
that investor to lower quality investments. For example, an
investor with $2 million in total assets may plan to invest
$200,000 in a startup launched by a trusted former colleague and
friend, but the proposed investment cap might limit investment
to $50,000. The investor might invest the remaining $150,000 in
startups founded by strangers. Dividing the investment among
four companies, rather than the one trusted entrepreneur, may
expose the investor to higher transaction costs (because the
investor may take additional steps to verify information) and
increased chance of opportunistic behavior (because strangers are
subject to weaker reputational constraints).
Without empirical research testing the effects of caps, it is
difficult to rule out this possibility altogether. But there are good
reasons to suspect a different result. Investment in private
placements is not as common as investment in real estate, public
equities, investment funds held in retirement accounts,
certificates of deposit, and life insurance products.232 One would
expect the hypothetical investor to turn to these more accessible
asset classes rather than stretching to find additional private
placements.

232. See supra note 217 (discussing the number of households that report
owning real estate); Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 205, at 24–31 tbl. 6 (reporting
that the following percentages of households own the following investment
products: retirement accounts, 50%; life insurance with cash-surrender value,
20%; publicly traded stock, 15%; savings bonds, 12%; and certificates of deposit,
12%).

2312

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2253 (2014)
2. Death by a Thousand Cuts

One might object that this Article’s proposal, when compared
to the current Rule 506, simply spreads losses around so that all
investors suffer a little instead of a few investors suffering a lot.
One might ask: what is achieved by shuffling around losses?
First, modern portfolio theory suggests that where we situate
risk matters greatly. Except in the rare case of perfectly
correlated performance, the impact of an individual security’s
risk is reduced when combined with other securities.233
Second, this Article posits that investment caps may, over
time, improve information by reducing incentives to defraud. In
other words, individual outcomes may improve as high-quality
issuers are better able to distinguish themselves.234 In contrast,
the current accredited-investor concept may create the perfect
storm for fraud and misinformation by lifting protections for
wealthy but unsophisticated investors.235
In sum, both a static view (assuming the reform simply
redistributes failed investments) and a more dynamic view
(asserting that investment caps will reduce fraud over time)
suggest that reshuffling matters.
3. Asset Verification Problems
This Article eschews more complex diversification and
liquidity standards for administrative ease, but the proposal still
depends on relatively accurate estimates of asset values. One
might object that the burdens of asset verification will make the
exemption unattractive (if the verification process is too strict) or
ineffective (if the process is too lax). 236
233. See supra notes 194–202 and accompanying text (discussing
diversification and covariance).
234. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing incentives for
fraud).
235. Supra note 189 and accompanying text.
236. For a thoughtful discussion of verification issues relating to the
crowdfunding exemption, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., Selling Equity Through
Crowdfunding: A Comment, U. Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-11,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2386278 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2386278 (Jan. 27, 2014).
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This same objection could be raised in regard to current
sorting methods. The accredited-investor definition requires
calculation of net assets and income,237 just like this Article’s
proposal. Because the JOBS Act increased the importance of the
accredited-investor standard, the SEC recently promulgated new
guidance regarding acceptable asset and income verification
methods. The SEC suggests, but does not require, review of tax
documents, account statements, and certifications by securities
professionals.238 The proposed investment cap could adopt this
existing framework.
4. Human Capital
For many individuals, their greatest investment is human
capital—the skills, experience, and education on which their
livelihood is based.239 This Article’s proposal does not take human
capital into account when calculating the cap.
To an extent, this is just another tradeoff between more
effective diversification and administrative ease. One could try to
put a value on an investor’s human capital, attempt to establish
the degree of correlation between that value and the type of
private placement in question, and adjust the cap accordingly.
But the administrative and theoretical difficulty of doing so
would be considerable,240 so this Article’s proposal settles for less
effective diversification.
In limited circumstances, adding human capital to the
equation could render an investment cap counterproductive. For
example, an employee of a semiconductor company may be
heavily invested in his or her employer’s stock, and investment in
an oil and gas partnership, even in amounts above the
237. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215(e)–(f) (2014) (setting forth the definition of an
accredited investor).
238. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2014).
239. See MALKIEL, supra note 46, at 228 (identifying human capital as an
important asset); William K. S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market
is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 371 (1986) (discussing human capital
in the context of the capital-asset pricing model); John F. Wasik, The Biggest
Financial Asset in Your Portfolio Is You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2013, at F7
(asserting that human capital is often one’s most important asset).
240. See id. (discussing the difficulty of valuing human capital).
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investment cap, might be helpful on diversification grounds
because the investor started from such an undiversified position.
But such an investor’s “diversification” strategy of sinking a large
percentage of wealth into a single illiquid private placement
leaves a lot to be desired. An investment cap may still have
benefits if it prompts the investor to rethink the proposed
investment and instead consider the more liquid and diversified
investment products readily available in today’s marketplace.241
5. Empirical Uncertainty
This Article’s analysis is based on evidence where
possible.242 But, some of its conclusions necessarily rest on
empirically untested estimations of costs and benefits, such as
whether sorting or investment caps improve overall information
in the market by reducing incentives to defraud.
Hopefully, this Article can serve as a starting point for future
empirical research. But it is also important to recognize that
empirical consensus takes time, and the dysfunction of current
exemptions may justify regulatory experimentation sooner rather
than later. In recent decisions, courts overturned rulemaking by
second guessing how the SEC weighed competing empirical
evidence.243 Regulatory policy may suffer if the SEC must wait for
empirical researchers to complete relevant work, let alone reach a
consensus. In some cases, adapting to the market may require
playing a regulatory hunch and expanding apparently successful
initiatives.244
241. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing typical
investment assets).
242. See, e.g., supra notes 217, 232 (citing data on household wealth); supra
notes 156, 210 (citing evidence regarding use of Regulation D).
243. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“In view of the admittedly (and at best) ‘mixed’ empirical evidence, we think the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission has not sufficiently supported its
conclusion . . . .” (citation omitted)).
244. For example, in 1988 the SEC created a registration exemption
specifically for stock option grants, apparently to accommodate emerging Silicon
Valley compensation practices. See Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts,
53 Fed. Reg. 12, 918-02 (Apr. 20, 1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230,
239) (announcing the adoption of Rule 701 and referencing startup companies).
The SEC then gradually expanded the exemption as it functioned without
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6. Why Protect the Rich?

The proposed investment cap does not phase out at any
income level. This is in part because it is assumed that issuers
making sales to elite investors can rely on § 4(a)(2) of the ’33 Act
and related case law, rather than the proposed safe harbor.245
Still, one might ask whether private placement regulation should
more definitively phase out at some level of wealth.
First, there is a doctrinal answer to this question. The ’33 Act
charges regulators with protecting investors without reference to
wealth.246 And historically, case law interpreting the ’33 Act has
based exemption on the investors’ ability to “fend for themselves,”
not their ability to absorb loss.247
Second, this Article suggests sound policy reasons for
protecting the wealthy and unsophisticated. Their gullibility may
have spillover effects by chumming the waters for fraud.248
That said, regulatory resources are scarce, and it may be
reasonable to leave the protection of the wealthiest to
professional advisers. In that case, any wealth standard should
be based on an informed judgment about the availability of
quality investment advice. For example, many investment
advisers require that a minimum value of assets be placed under
the adviser’s management.249 If private placement regulation
phases out, the threshold should be based on having assets in an
amount and of a type consistent with these customary
minimums.250
notable abuse of stock option recipients. See MAYNARD & WARREN, supra note
115, at 244 (discussing the expansion of Rule 701 in 1999).
245. See supra Part V.A (describing the scope of the proposal).
246. Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
247. Supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 145–46 (discussing potential
negative spillover effects of unsophisticated investors).
249. See Marla Brill, How to Afford an Investment Adviser Without Breaking
the Bank, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2011, 11:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/12/13/us-usa-investing-adviser-idUSTRE7BC1AN20111213 (last visited
Nov. 19, 2014) (discussing traditional and emerging fee structures for
investment advisers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
250. For example, one of the competing proposals discussed above includes a
phase-out of the investment cap at a certain net asset value based on
availability of professional advice. See Oguss, supra note 158, at 285. But a
threshold based on the size of the individual’s investible assets (those capable of
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VI. Conclusion

We continue to view private placement regulation as an
important lever for economic recovery and growth, but we are
frustrated by policymakers’ inability to find the elusive balancing
point between capital formation and investor protection. The
existing discourse suggests that setting private placement policy
should be like adjusting a carburetor. When private placements
are too strict, we starve the economy of important fuel. When
regulations are too lenient, we fail to protect investors by flooding
them with aggressive and manipulative offerings. We expect that
a skilled regulator or legislature, like a skilled mechanic, will
eventually find the perfect balancing point.
This Article suggests the concepts of capital formation and
investor protection, their relationship to each other, and their
relationship to specific regulatory policies are more complicated
than the existing discourse suggests. A more nuanced analysis
produces a surprising result. Investment caps—found in an
obscure provision of a mostly ineffectual set of reforms—should
be the foundation of private placement regulation.

being put under management of an adviser, such as stocks, bonds, and cash)
would be better tailored to this rationale.
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Table 1
Relationship Between
Capital Formation & Investor Protection

Investor-Choice
Protection
Aligned
Capital
Formation

Facilitates
mutually
beneficial
transactions by
addressing info
asymmetry

Paternalistic
Protection
Ambiguous
Relationship

Populist
Protection
Ambiguous
Relationship

 Tension:
Reduces
sources of
financing

 Tension: Sacrifices
efficiency for fairness
(e.g., insider trading?)

 Aligned:
Boosts
investor
confidence

 Aligned: Broadens
participation in capital
markets

Table 2
The Mechanisms in Theory
Investor Protection

Capital Formation

Smart
Money
(e.g., scaled
disclosure
& sorting)

Strongly251

Investor Choice

Paternalistic

Populist

Strongly

Strongly

Weakly

Encourages investing Facilitates investor
preferences by:
by:
 Optimizing
information
 Disincentivizing
fraud

 Optimizing
information

Prevents
Excludes some
incapable
investors altogether
investors from
making mistakes

 Disincentivizing
fraud

251. A mechanism is strongly aligned or consistent with a goal when it
apparently advances the goal with no material and counter-productive side
effects. A mechanism is moderately aligned with a goal when it arguably both
advances and frustrates the goal and it is unclear which effect dominates. A
mechanism is weakly aligned with a goal when it does not advance the goal in
any appreciable way, or it frustrates the goal without materially advancing it at
the same time.
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Moderately

Moderately

Strongly

Moderately

Mad
Money
(e.g.,
investment
caps)

 Encourages
investing by
disincentivizing
fraud

 Facilitates
Mitigates
Allows all investors
preferences by
some access
disincentivizing consequences of
investor mistakes
fraud

 Discourages
investing by
increasing issuer
transaction costs

 Constrains riskpreferring
choices

Table 3
The Mechanisms in Practice
Investor Protection
Capital Formation

Weakly
Smart
Money
(e.g., scaled
disclosure
& sorting)

(e.g.,
investment
caps)

Paternalistic

Populist

Weakly

Weakly

Weakly

Wealthy
incapable
investors not
protected from
mistakes

Some investors
arbitrarily excluded
from market

Moderately

Moderately

Discourages investing Frustrates investor
by:
preferences by:
 Mandating
unwanted
disclosure

 Mandating
unwanted
disclosure

 Incentivizing
fraud

 Incentivizing
fraud

Moderately
Mad
Money

Investor
Choice

 Encourages
investing by
disincentivizing
fraud
 Discourages
investing by
increasing
issuer
transaction
costs

Moderately
 Facilitates
preferences by
disincentivizing
fraud

Somewhat
mitigates
consequences of
investor
mistakes
 Constrains riskpreferring
choices

Allows all investors
some access

